Diary of a Politically Incorrect Vagabond

Bringing Change in a Praetorian State - Hamza Alavi Distinguished Lecture 2011

2011-12-26T20:35:00.000-08:00

The mirage of middle class revolution

The middle class is incapable of bringing change in a praetorian state like Pakistan

Change seems to be the new anthem exciting the people of Pakistan. Crushed or pulled apart by two opposing influences, people want change. On the one hand, there is the humiliation of being endlessly poor and powerless, suffering from a moth-eaten political system. On the other, there is the burden of an image of a pariah state that has resulted in reduction of opportunities for an average Pakistani. There are several diagnosis and an equal number of prescriptions.

However, what seems to have caught the imagination of many, especially in large urban centers, is the idea of replacement of the traditional elite comprising of feudal landowners and industrial-business elite by the middle class. The latest political narrative being spread through the media and newer publications talks about the growing power of the middle class. There are at least two books published in 2011 that repeat the middle class mantra. But will this emerging middle class bring the much-needed change in Pakistan?

In sociological terms the concept of lower, middle and upper classes developed as a response to the rigid and deterministic Marxian definition of class. However, as experts point out there is no consensus on what constitutes these different categories, especially the middle class. Every society though has its own variation. For instance, while looking at Pakistan, the middle class must be divided amongst three levels: lower, middle and upper, as well as on the basis of location such as urban versus rural middle class. According to Nayyab, the middle class represents the middle position on the continuum of wealth, power and prestige.

“In the wealth continuum middle class can be presented by individuals who are neither rentiers nor unskilled labourers. On the power continuum they can be the people who are not as weak as to carry out the commands of others but not as influential to achieve their goals despite opposition. Similarly, they cannot be individuals who receive little respectful treatment nor the ones who are entitled to deferential and respectful treatment”.

There are three estimates of the size of the middle class: first, 20 million; second, Ishrat Hussain’s 30 million; and third, Durre Nayyab’s 61 million. Nayyab’s definition uses the concept of ‘extended middle class’. Without getting into the issues of definition, it is noteworthy that the growth of the middle class is accompanied with increased urbanisation. In fact, Pakistan has the fastest growth rate of urbanisation in South Asia. The estimated growth rate of urbanization for 2005 is calculated at 35 percent. According to Arif Hassan, this urbanisation also includes migration from rural to urban areas. About 8 percent of the total population (1998 census) comprises of migrants, out of which 63.7 percent have migrated from rural to urban areas. Another important phenomenon is the growing number of urban centres. For instance, in Punjab alone there are five large cities (population around 10 million), 15 intermediate cities (population around 5 million), 74 small cities (population around 1 million), and 114 towns (population less than 50,000). This number will increase after the new census.

As far as the nature of the middle class is concerned, the bulk of the rural middle class represents medium-sized (less then 100 acres) farmers and the burgeoning trader-merchant class that live in towns or small cities but have cropped up from villages and depend on the agrarian economy. The rural-urban borderland middle class, on the other hand, comprises trader-merchants, small businessmen and professional class belonging to various vocational groups in intermediate cities and large cities. The purely urban middle and upper middle class includes the bulk of the state bureaucracy such as civil servants and military, the burgeoning media, judiciary and legal community, the NGO sector and professional expatriate Pakistanis that are keen to build their influence in their home country by remaining central to its politics. The case of Ghulam Nabi Fai, an expatriate Kashmiri leader based in the US and some of his friends that were allegedly part of the ISI’s operations in Washington, DC is a case in point.

One of the primary assumptions is that this extended middle class works for and is an instrument of change. It is also believed that this class aims at a new agenda that represents departure from the traditional elite. Since the middle class is an intermediary class that has the potential of transforming into the upper class, it desires an environment that supports upward mobility. In Pakistan’s case, the upward mobility of the middle class thus far has been in the form of economic growth accompanied by very slow political growth. Hence the argument is that the empowerment of the middle class will result in a drastic change in the country’s power structure. Some even argue that such empowerment will trickle down to the lower classes as well. The subtext of this change theory is that empowerment of the middle class will bring liberal-secular modernity to the country. The political movement led by Imran Khan or Pervez Musharraf and a few others is viewed as representing the ethos of the middle class. People like Shaoib Hashmi have defended Musharraf’s coup on television programmes on the basis of the general representing middle class ethos.

Does this middle class have the capacity to bring a real change based on political liberalism? No. Here is why it is not possible.

First, as some would argue that Pakistan actually does not have a middle class but an middle income class. This differentiation is due to the inherently pre-capitalist nature of the socioeconomy that has not gone through the same experience of industrialization as Europe where the entire argument of the middle class was based. Second, the middle class cannot be politically progressive as it is a product of a praetorian society and political structure that is driven by politico-economic factors such as the link between military dictatorships and the middle class. The economic growth of the extended middle class is linked with a praetorian state system that is based on kleptocratic distributive system. There are two aspects of it: one, according to Akbar Zaidi, the regimes of Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf built and provided fillip to the middle class in terms of enhancing its economic potential which creates a bonding between the military regimes and the middle class; and two, given the praetorian nature of the society, which means it is driven by an authoritarian instinct, the political process remains dependent on military authoritarianism even under civilian governments and the distributive system kleptocratic. Not surprisingly, this group of people is inclined towards authoritarian rule, especially by the military, rather than support the democratic process. Most recently, new political movements denoted by urban-based political parties such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf – PTI (the justice party) run by the former cricketer Imran Khan espouses wrangling political control through the army’s help. This in Pakistan is referred to as the ‘Bangladesh model’, a form of a middle class coup meant to eliminate traditional power centres.

The military in Pakistan, which is also considered as representing the middle class interests, is inclined to insert a ‘clean’ party in the political process. In any case, the armed forces, which form a sizable chunk of the middle class, are inclined towards their organisational control of politics of the state, indirectly if not directly. Therefore, the middle class is not necessarily inclined towards a democratic process. Such a behavior is directly related with the absence of means to negotiate political power through legitimate means. The society has become so deeply praetorian that it cannot imagine a change without force. The middle class aligns with faces rather than values and principles resulting in a situation where particular groups will align with set icons in the name of liberalism or radicalism.

Third, a glance at the behavior of various groups that fall in the category of extended middle class shows that it has an authoritarian nature. The media and the legal community, for instance, are as inclined towards force as the elite. So there is no basic difference between the two.

Fourth, the divide between the middle class and the elite may be imaginary as the various classes are linked and so the extended middle class is partly an extension of the ruling elite. Historically, the urban middle class grew into the elite, which Hamza Alavi categorised in his work as the indigenous bourgeoisie and metropolitan capitalist. The state has always had a direct role in elevating groups from one class to another. The British state, for instance, made many middle class players, who worked as its contractors into upper middle class and later the upper class. Similarly, the deep state or the establishment in the country has supported various groups and propelled them or kept them in power. Hamza Alavi expounded upon this factor at great length. Describing and explaining the linkage between the various power centers or classes is certainly one of his biggest contributions. In his seminal work that explained Pakistan as an overdeveloped state, Alavi hypothised about the linkage between the various elite groups and the manner in which their interests were served and protected by the military and the civil bureaucracy. The state evolved as a bureaucratic state in which the bureaucratic forces were more powerful and the politicians to legitimise the former’s power. Although Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal has vehemently challenged Alavi’s perspective, the fact of the matter is that it is Alavi’s paradigm that aids in understanding the peculiar behavior of Pakistan’s power politics.

It is important to understand the power structure and behavior of power politics to understand why the middle class may not be the agent of change. Pakistan has a power structure in which power is a continual process that does not stop but changes face and perhaps colour. The middle class, which is being imagined as the focal point of power in the future, has actually never been out of power.

According to Akbar Zaidi, the regimes of Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq had built and provided fillip to the middle class in terms of enhancing its economic potential. Let us also not forget that one of the major components of the middle class is the military and civil bureaucracy that has undergone a class transformation as well. A recent research done by Shuja Nawaz and Christine Fair highlights the changing colour of the military as being more urban middle class. This is not a recent phenomenon but something that had begun to happen after the 1950s when the indigenisation of the officer cadre forced the military to increase its induction and so it could not be limited to just the elite families. The intake into the two bureaucracies has a strong middle class component. It is another matter that there is a class system within the bureaucracies as well in which the echelons integrate smoothly with the rest of the ruling elite mainly due to common interests. However, those at the bottom of the ladder aspire to get to the top and thus become protectors of elite interests. Or those at the bottom of the ladder have been made to believe that it is through their association with a particular organisation or interest group that they can further their own interests.

People like Fahmida Riaz and Shoaib Hashmi, among many others, failed to understand the peculiar construct of the country’s power politics. Had they read Hamza Alavi and understood his underlying philosophy, they might not have been confused by Musharraf’s personality. It would certainly not take them much time to understand that the middle class may be the background for many in the military and civil bureaucracy but, once at the top, the echelons are integrated into the elite and represent elite interests rather then that of their original class. Power wipes out their original memory or association with the lower-middle or middle class except for some superficial values or belief system.

The power structure has resulted in the evolution of a praetorian society or what Alavi used to call the pre-capitalist socioeconomy which means a combination of feudalism and post-colonial capital. Most important, force, authority and even violence is central to the social structure. The formula is not liberal at all. So, we have to think hard when we talk about rampant feudalism in the country. It is fashionable to say that the middle class will become a source of ending feudalism when the fact of the matter is that the feudalism’s physical shape has changed. The 2008 Parliament, for instance, has about 25 members out of a house of 342 with over 100 acres landholding. Not to forget the leadership of parties like the PML-N, PML-Q and Jamaat-e-islami that have a middle class background. Even the current PPP leadership, a party usually associated with feudal-landowners, has become a mix of rural and urban middle class with peppering of traditional elite. This is not the defence of the feudal-landowners but it is to understand and explain how it is not necessarily kinship that cuts across class, sect and cast which determines the power of an individual or a group. In addition, it is how a particular group is connected with the power centre and included into the kleptocratic distributive system.

This system determines both the distribution of power and resources. Thus, the state and its establishment plays a critical role in determining who will be powerful and what kind of power each will have. The establishment is the permanent power which comprises of primary and secondary players. Over the decades since independence, the arrangement of these players has changed. But in the past five decades, the military and civil bureaucracy have been almost like permanent members of the establishment. One of the reasons for this is the state authority which is critical for power politics. Today, the media, expatriate Pakistanis and even jihadis are part of the relationship. These actors are certainly not part of the traditional elite but the middle class. However, they have risen to become part of the new elite which is as exploitative as the old one. But the hatred and dislike of the traditional elite, the emphasis on religion and militant-nationalism, are some of the tools to generate a narrative that helps control the society and the ordinary people. Controlling the narrative or influencing the mind of the masses through a discourse is central to establishing the hegemony of the establishment. In a conversation I once had with Hamza Alavi, he explained to me how the same forces that apply real-politique rules for their actions then emphasise moral-politique. This is mainly to establish hegemony which is a triangular equation comprising of: “political power + economic power + intellectual control”.

The military-dominated establishment has in 64 years created a sophisticated formula for generating a narrative and building partners that cut across all ideological divide. The liberal and the conservative and the radical are all in some form of partnership with the establishment, most certainly in the extended middle class. The lower class or the dispossessed are too uninteresting for the establishment to partner. The machinery for generating the establishment-friendly narrative is so extensive and well-oiled that it has almost completely dominated all means of producing and communicating the narrative. As a result, the society, especially the middle class has structured itself along two axis: neo-liberal-nationalism and right-wing-radical-nationalism. While the neo-liberal-nationalism axis depicts an authoritarian and top-down model of economic and political development marked with the expansion of a national security obsessed middle class and ruling elite, the right-wing-radical-nationalism axis denotes growth of religious radicalism and militancy as symbols of geo-political modernity and being anti-imperialist in nature.

It is due to the fact that all stakeholders take strength from the praetorian culture that it is impossible for them to formulate things in terms of liberal values and democratic principles. For instance, the supporters of PTI and its leadership do not believe in following the democratic means for change. Rather, they want to use extra-constitutional methods to bring a change that would then represent middle class rule and democracy. Similarly, the representatives of the middle class even though they are liberal, have little patience for any alternative perspective such as disagreement by ethnic minorities. There is, in fact, greater acceptability for the use of violence against ethnic minorities or any other group that disagrees with the central narrative. The formula of the upcoming middle class, hence, is not only a contradiction in terms but denotes praetorian behavior of the society. In any case, the middle class is not liberal, secular and politically progressive. The middle class politics is actually about initiating the process of re-formatting the power political structure rather than any deep-set structural change. The establishment, which had supported a certain type of players, is now keen to replace them with others. Therefore, it is not that pre-capitalist socioeconomic structure is changed at all or feudalism discarded but that there are newer actors who have become the neo-feudal such as the media barons, media practitioners, significant members of the legal and judicial community and the militants.

Today, it’s not merely coincidence that militant organisations hold jirgas and enforce their version of justice in certain areas of Punjab and Sindh. They have acquired this power due to their association with the state and the establishment which does not allow its law enforcement agencies to really apprehend the jihadis. One phone call and the friendly ones captured by the police are freed. Like the traditional feudal-landowners that had grown powerful in the past in assistance from the civil and military bureaucracy, the militants and other groups mentioned earlier have risen to a level where they cannot be challenged due to their association with the establishment. Today, the militants question the power of the feudal-landowners resulting in a change in the power equation. Consequently, there is not a single political party or group that does not have a linkage or partnership with the militants. Violence and unquestionable power is the name of the game as far as the country’s politics is concerned.

It is not just the traditional elite or even the new elite that recognise the growing power of the militants. The new rural and urban middle class, especially in the emerging urban centers contributes resources and supports militant organisations and madrassas. For those who get passionate about supporting the seminaries as part of the local culture, the fact is that the old madrassas were tied to the local culture but not the new ones are burgeoning all over the place. In the past 6-7 years, for instance, more than 2,500 new madrassas have been established in rural Sindh. These are the ones with high walls and no connection with the local culture or people. The middle class contributes because it sees the militants as a possible source for renegotiating power in a system where power cannot be renegotiated through non-violent and legitimate means. This kind of middle class, hence, is what can be defined as representing right-wing-radical-nationalism axis. Interestingly, this trend can be found amongst the more educated urban middle class living in large cities as well.

Last year, I conducted a study on the socio-political attitudes of youth in elite universities in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. One of the surprising findings of the study was that their world view was not very different from that of the madrassa trained youth. The militants are seen as representing a force that can fight for and serve the national cause vis-à-vis the external world, especially the US. This is the same thinking that is echoed by liberal leftist thinkers like Tariq Ali or many others without calculating the cost of such association for the state and the society. In other words, the other axis, which is neo-liberal-nationalism, is indirectly tied with the other axis. The common denominator is nationalism, a trend worth looking at because nationalism produces different results including fascism.

In Pakistan’s case, there is a greater likelihood of extreme forms because of the praetorian nature of the society. In any case, the neo-liberal-nationalist represents Pakistan’s neo-conservatives the bulk of whom may not support the militants or the radicals but swing towards the military and the state establishment. These neo-cons, in fact, have increasingly been swinging towards a more non-religious-militant- nationalism. This group usually considers itself as liberal because it is anti-mullah. However, it is not politically liberal and more inclined towards partnering with non-religious elements amongst the military as a guarantor of ‘liberal security’.

The bottom-line is that the middle class formula that is being espoused by some segments of the elite as a harbinger of great change and transformation is nothing more than a bid to carry out some cosmetic restructuring of the political scene without altering the norms of politics or the basic structure of the state system. Pakistan is a praetorian society which means that it is mired in or inclined towards illegal and excessive authority and violence. Different segments of the society tend to partner with various actors that possess means of force and violence to renegotiate power.

Will this trend change? The answer is not in the short to medium term. There is no magic wand that can change the way this society operates. There are people who suggest that given some changes in the political system, greater democratisation of the political parties, more sensibility by the politicians and other such means Pakistan will change into something akin to a new shiny coin or close to it. Others believe that installing systems will bring the change. The mantra is bringing change from within.

None of these tactical methodologies will work beyond a short span at best. The situation must be weighed against the nature of the power political structure. The current day Pakistan lacks the societal sensibility to calculate the opportunity cost of praetorianism that would lead them to think of switching from the ‘roving bandits’ to the ‘stationary bandits’ formula. While studying Pakistan, it is instructive to remember the economist Mancur Olson who wrote about kleptocratic distributive system and the problems of over-plundering. According to Olson’s concept of roving versus stationary bandit, roving bandits enforce a higher cost on the settled community/town/village that they pillage. By engaging in collective over plundering, the roving bandits impose a negative externality on the society resulting in depletion of resources. This ultimately reduces the dividends for the bandits as well. The stationary bandits, on the other hand, are rational; since they settle down in a community, and agreeing to willingly protect the society against other roving bandits in return for economic gains. The entire paradigm is based on negotiation of mutual interests. Applied to Pakistan’s case, this means that the ruling elite the emphasis is on over-plundering at the cost of the masses and the country’s well being. The middle class is also part of the kleptocratic cycle.

Since the country is generally dependent on external sources of income, the current over plundering has not resulted in an urgent realisation for transformation. Perhaps, a state and society continually in a mode to beg and borrow from foreign sources or means not internal to the economy cannot begin to comprehend the significance of domestic re-engineering. This behavior is reflective of the feudal tendencies of the society, or the ruling elite. The Pakistani middle class or those that represent middle class interests are no exception when it comes to plunder. Incidentally, these middle class forces including the state bureaucracy and some political parties also suffer from a feudal attitude. The use of force and coercion is similar as one hears in stories about the jagirdars. In fact, jagirdars have proliferated. Nevertheless, the mantra of the middle class as an agent of change is extremely powerful. People can hardly guess that the middle class suffers from praetorian behavior mainly due to the fact that education and access to sources of information puts them in a position where they can ably manipulate image and analysis. Surely, the voice of the poor farm or factory labour in remote parts of the country is less likely to reach the elite than those with access to media. Education is an enabling tool as far as influencing image is concerned.

At this juncture, there is nothing short of structural change that will do the trick. Pakistan needs a regime change, which does not refer to a shift from civil to military or vice versa, but a real structural change. Most formulas are long-term including the age-old method of injecting more democracy to kill bad democracy. We always forget that a single election does not bring democracy. Every time the process is interrupted, the machine has to be started once again. So, every interruption, no matter what form it takes, brings the system back to where it started. Not to forget that we have an unnatural environment of the establishment constantly interfering with the process of electoral democracy. Referring to the theoretical framework presented by Hamza Alavi, it has also become difficult to separate the grain from the chaff as the civilian powers are connected with the establishment or are its secondary or primary partners. There is this inherent flaw in Pakistan’s socio-political system that may not repair until there is a direct conflict between the power fraternity and the dispossessed. This means more suffering until we get to a point where a genuine demand for change is generated and people are moved to combine forces and alter the structure rather than replace a face.

Some might consider this as nonsensical but can Pakistan even dream of bringing about a change without acquiring tools for transformation? Pakistan needs its genuine historians, political scientists, sociologists, philosophers and scientists to conceptualise a metamorphosis. This is no mean idea but its only with the birth of sociologists like Hamza Alavi and Feroz Ahmed, historians like Aziz Ahmed, scientists like Abdus Salam and many others that we will step on the path of change. Pakistanis have to get praetorianism out of our bloodstream to become sane again.

Maleeha Lodhi Juggling a Dream

2011-09-13T01:50:00.000-07:00

Maleeha Lodhi’s edited volume is one of the few books that Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations’ head Maj. General Athar Abbas recommends to his visitors. The value of this book for Pakistan’s armed forces and establishment is that it presents Pakistan as ‘beyond a crisis state’. The basic thesis of the volume is that there are many things which are not right about the country but that in itself does not qualify it as a failed or failing state. The seventeen contributors have come together in this volume to present the generally unsung successes of Pakistan or to make it look like a normal state, like any other.

Having gone through the book from cover to cover a reader can get a bit lost. There are some chapters which tend to stand alone as Ahmed Rasheed’s on Afghanistan. Broadly, the seventeen chapters can be divided into five discussion themes: (a) presenting an alternative narrative, (b) history of Pakistan’s birth (c) debate on the changing nature of civil- military relations, (d) opinion by Pakistani expatriates on technical issues such as improving governance, economic development, solving problems of energy generation, and improving quality of youth through education, and (e) military-strategic issues such as nuclear security, military strategy, relations with India, and debate on Afghanistan. The book is a great example of an edited volume since it does not burden a reader with a long introduction and conclusion. Moreover, it neatly brings together three kinds of authors: (a) those who have a big name and hence market value such as Ahmed Rasheed, Ayesha Jalal, Akbar S. Ahmed, Ishrat Husain and Mohsin Hamid, (b) writers with technical expertise or a bent of mind which is sympathetic to the military establishment like Muneer Akram, Riffat Hussain, Brig. (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, Shuja Nawaz snd Meekal Ahmed, and (c) young writers who are meant to bring a fresh perspective, for instance, Moeed Yusuf and Ziad Haider. The book is wanting in terms of a solid debate on youth, women, and relations with the US, India and the Muslim world. The chapter on youth and education by Moeed Yusuf or Riffat Hussain’s contribution on analysing a couple of decades of India-Pakistan peace initiatives does not fulfill the purpose.

Irrespective of how sympathetic one feels with Lodhi’s agenda of improving Pakistan’s image, the task could have been done in a more sophisticated manner than, for instance, by Mohsin Hamid’s suggestion that the country must be taken seriously because it is the 6th largest country in the world and has more non-Muslims living in it than the total population of Toronto and Miami. Even more non-serious is the suggestion that honour killings can be ignored because better things happen as well such as men dressing up as transvestites and doing a television show. All states and societies have inherent contradictions. But one behaviour pattern cannot be deemed as representing the overall attitude of a society. Pakistan’s problem is not that it will physically dissolve. At this juncture, it is physically secure with all external and internal stakeholders interested in keeping the state alive. However, it is also a fact that all players want to dominate and capture the state including the militants.

So, the narrative in this book does not really explain the direction which the country is taking, nor does it analyse the impact of the growing latent radicalism in Pakistan on the future of its people and the region as a whole. It is even more difficult to sympa- thize with Akbar S. Ahmed’s assertion in the book that the historical confusion regarding the state’s ideology, which dates back to its birth, is nothing more than strategic vagueness that was meant to gel different people and schools of thought together. The confusion created due to the lack of clarity of the country’s earlier and later leadership has pushed the country in a direction where it has become a nest of militancy and latent- radicalism. What is required, as suggested in Ziad Haider’s excellent analysis, is an alternative narrative. However, neither Haider nor any other contributor to this volume has mulled over the issue of an alternative religious, political and social discourse that may take the country out of its current logjam.

Pakistan’s fundamental problem is that the state defines citizenship on the basis of a citizen’s putative relationship with religion and the central establishment. This leaves out millions of non-Muslims or members of minority ethnic communities from a sense of representation. Those that choose to protest their rights like the East Pakistanis or Baluch are then brutally butchered in the name of national security. This volume chooses to focus on religion related violence. This category of violence cannot be stopped because the problem of the religiosity of the state becomes compounded with another issue of a powerful military bureaucracy, an institution which tends to use all measures including religion and violence to gain its military-strategic objectives. According to Zahid Hussain, some of the militant groups were connected with the military due to the role they played in the possible resolution of the Kashmir issue or in helping GHQ Rawalpindi deal with India.

Whether it is the urge for strategic depth in Afghanistan or India in general the state’s strategic goals have been critical in changing social ethos and framed the attitude of the middle class. It is not the modern and liberal socioeconomic category that Lodhi imagines it to be. Had the editor gone more than skin-deep in digging into the character of the middle class, she and other contributors to this volume may have found that the bulk of the middle class is, in fact, radicalized or not liberal at all. The fact that people do not generally vote for the religious parties does not indicate the character of the society. Pakistan’s electoral politics responds to patronage politics and not to ideological politics. Maleeha Lodhi clearly shuns the feudal and patronage tendencies of the country’s political system and links it with the traditional elite. However, such analysis lacks depth and fails to present the correct picture that feudalism in Pakistan has actually morphed into different shapes and penetrated various institutions including the military and civil bureaucracy. So, it does not make any difference if, as Shuja Nawaz writes in his chapter on the military, the armed forces have become more diverse in terms of their ethnic composition or are increasingly from urban areas.

A number of authors in this book use highly superfluous and unscientific methodology to explain different social norms. In fact, there is little analysis on how the military visualizes itself or its role in the country’s power politics. The GHQ does not intend to empower the political leadership. Hence, Saeed Shafqat’s notion that the extension given to the Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani indicates a level of confidence of the political leadership in its own capacity to deal with the military, appear comical. Shafqat’s piece is certainly in a more academic style than many other chapters in this volume as it experiments with the concept of elite negotiation to explain the current coexistence between the political forces and the military. Pakistan’s military bureaucracy is known for making partnerships with civilian stakeholders which eventually make the organization last longer than, perhaps, its counterparts in the Middle East. The story of the coexistence between civil and military narrated by Shafqat does not do justice in explaining the real malaise of Pakistan’s political system.

It would have been a good idea to have a chapter dedicated to understanding Pakistan military’s preoccupation with India. In this regard the chapter by Muneer Akram, who is a senior Pakistani diplomat, on strategic issues is refreshing. It clearly explains that the establishment has moved away from its fear that India wants to destroy Pakistan. It is rare in the works on strategy to come across a clear perspective on the military’s perception on India as in the chapter mentioned here.

Equally good are the chapters on energy security and bureaucratic restructuring. Though a bit dense Ishrat Hussain’s chapter on administrative restructuring is another good contribution which will help any Pakistani government in improving governance. If asked to summarize the book, it is an expression of the desires of many Pakistanis to emerge as a successful country. Whether this dream will get fulfilled is a million dollar question which sadly doesn’t get answered in this book.

Two Dead...Twenty More to Go

2011-03-05T21:29:00.000-08:00

I had met Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti just a couple of months ago at a dinner party hosted by the Brazilian ambassador. He did not wear the airs of a minister or a VIP, was extremely personable and friendly to talk to. When I asked him about what was happening on the blasphemy law, and whether President Asif Zardari was doing anything about it, his answer was that though the president wanted to bring the change, he was surrounded by people in his party who would not let him do it. In fact, almost a year ago, the president had invited a few civil society members and told them to keep reminding him about bringing the much-needed change in the controversial blasphemy law and improving relations with India.

Unfortunately, now it appears as though he won’t be able to fulfil any of those wishes. The death of two senior members of the government, Salman Taseer followed by Bhatti, would push Zardari further into hiding. Perhaps his insistence to the civil society to keep the pressure on him was meant to create a counter-balance to the hyper-conservative elements in his party. He wanted to show them that there was sufficient demand from the liberal civil society in the country to consider a review of the blasphemy law, which was made and implemented under General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule.

One wonders if the president realised then that Pakistan’s liberal civil society is composed of a handful of people, and is getting smaller by the day. Not too long ago, Senator Farid Paracha of the Jamaat-e-Islami had challenged a liberal Pervez Hoodbhoy on television and told him that the religious right knows exactly who this handful of liberals are. And the religious zealots are now taking the liberals down, one by one. So, if you are a liberal, better write your own obituary and keep it close for the moment when your turn comes.

Why can’t civil society fight these militant forces? There are several explanations. First, the liberal sections of society have always remained confused between social, cultural and political liberalism. Therefore, liberal poets like Fahmida Riaz, who remained in self-exile in India under Zia’s regime, consider Pervez Musharraf’s government liberal and representative of middle-class values. But does she even know that the bulk of the middle class is conservative, and many of them aid and abet jihadis and fund madarsas? She probably doesn’t even realise that her middle-class hero Musharraf had actively partnered with the jihadis while holding his glass of whiskey in the other hand.

Second, this socially liberal civil society remains confined to upper and upper-middle classes that cannot fathom the socio-political growth of the rest of Pakistan. One wonders when the liberal elite interacted with real Pakistan. They seem surprised that the heroes of middle-class urban Pakistan are people like Faisal Shahzad, Aafia Siddiqui and Mumtaz Qadri. As for the lower-class Pakistani, he/she cannot afford God, like the poor in other parts of the world. No effort was ever made to liberate the lower classes socially and politically.

Third, a shift in the trajectory of the Muslim elite at the time of Partition. Having made a country in the name of religion, the elite then abandoned the religious discourse to the mullah with whom they had an understanding, so that religion and religious slogans could be borrowed from time to time to gain legitimacy. More then 60 years after, the liberal elite has no control over the religious discourse.

At this juncture, Pakistan represents a fairly slow Iranian model. What must be watched is the bridge-building between the Deobandis, the Ahl-Hadith and the Barelvis. This may translate in the medium- to long-term into creating a hybrid-moderate-theocracy. The word “moderate” implies the presence of some liberal elements that are needed to engage with the rest of the world. But in the longer term, it could push further towards a fully theocratic state.

Lest we forget, the brutal murders of Taseer and Bhatti indicate the coming of age of Zia’s children. The bulk of educated civil society, including the media and lawyers, are tilted towards the ideological right. The judiciary is known to free murderers like the head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other jihadi organisations because the police cannot provide evidence to convict them. In such a situation, all we need to do is begin counting the bodies. It is two gone and twenty more to go.

Are You there Mr President?

2011-03-05T21:23:00.000-08:00

Rehman Malik has yet again scattered his pearls of illogic by imposing restriction on artists visiting India who will now have to seek a no-objection-certificate (NoC) from the ministry. Initially, it sounded as if he meant everyone visiting India. It seems so reminiscent of Zia days.

More important, I wonder what the President has to say in his defense when he had reminded some visiting civil society members a year ago of constantly pestering him to revoke the blasphemy law and improve relations with India. Creating space in the religious discourse and improving relations with regional states is critical for Pakistan’s own growth and development. Since the end of the 1980s, every government seems to have realized this logic. Or was it a different Asif Zardari than this one who seems to have gone in hiding and so allows his interior minister to shoot himself and the entire nation in the foot? Or is it that the President is too scared to implement what he had reminded the civil society members? We know that his party is completely divided on supporting Taseer and may be in a greater fix on improving ties with India.

Such restrictions on artists is absolutely ridiculous and gives the country an image of a state with an iron curtain just like the former Soviet Union had during the days of the Cold War with the US. A singer, an artist, a writer, poet, sculptor, or anyone who can create has a right to travel around freely. Unless the government employs these people, they are private citizens that sell certain services. It brings good name to the country when they perform abroad.

The government may or may not have any contribution in training these artists or making them famous. In any case, why should the government care about its citizen making a fool of himself or herself while they are abroad when it allows its great names like Mehdi Hassan or others to die in poverty and infamy? Lets be honest, it was only after Rahat Fateh Ali made his way to a bigger market in bollywood that he got noticed in Pakistan and outside.

Why such show of aimless ego when the government doesn’t really care about hundreds and thousands of Pakistanis that travel or live abroad? Or will Rehman Malik impose a condition on all Pakistanis traveling abroad to seek NoC just because some are caught steeling or engaging in other crimes in other countries? After all, people are people and they may or may not engage in activities that would eventually put them in trouble or embarrass them. But they do not necessarily become the government’s responsibility. In any case, if Mr Malik is so peeved about the state’s honor and wants to regulate the behavior and personal lives of citizens, he may also look into disciplining the numerous militant organizations that create trouble abroad. This might help the state’s image more than anything else.

The interior ministry does not even have the infrastructure and system to impose such a law. Such restrictions at best will ensure that Pakistani artists don’t get invited abroad.

The interior minister is possibly trying to make the establishment happy. But then, isn’t he supposed to get his queue from Asif Zardari? Or is it that the president himself has changed the way he used to think about peace and stability in the region and changing relations with neighbors?

I am also reminded of Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s first visit to the UK as a foreign minister. The Pakistani high commissioner gathered a few individuals from think tanks and some journalists for a dinner meeting with the foreign minister. Later in the evening, the foreign minister rose to give his speech. He passionately spoke about his desire to make his first trip to India and improve relations with the next door neighbor. It all sounded good except that the defense, air and naval attache’s sitting on my table did not see eye to eye with Shah Mehmmod Qureshi. Clearly, their brief was different from Qureshi’s. It was not too long before SQM also started following the brief from the GHQ rather than from his party’s leadership. Now, it appears that other ministers have gone the same route. A similar restriction was introduced under Zia’s rule which was fought back and removed through the efforts of Benazir Bhutto. It would help if someone saw the illogic of the above decision.

The Case of Cholistan's Stolen Land

2011-02-10T09:52:00.000-08:00

Anyone passing through lower Cholistan, especially if they happen to be participating in the famous Cholistan jeep rally, will not fail to notice the prominent Lashkare Tayyaba (LeT) and Jamat-ud-Daawa (JuD) wall-chalkings. One of the slogans decries India for being “a water thief.” Water is a sensitive issue for people who don’t have access to it. India’s decision to construct new dams or to control the flow of water is causing major concern in the area. But that is not only the cause of concern in the region.

Move on towards Sadiqabad and Rahimyar Khan in Bahawalpur and you will hear farmers complain about how the army is stealing their share of water. In the past few years, people of the area have held public demonstration against water theft but to no avail. According to official estimates, 21,000 acres of land in these two districts are affected due to water theft from the Abbasia link canal. Out of the canal’s capacity of 4500 cusecs of water, nearly 350-400 cusecs are being stolen. This canal became operational in 2002 and the army units have made 20 illegal outlets (104-109 RD and 213-228 RD) at Chak Wahni and Qasimwala heads to feed their lands. Officially, the army is only allowed one outlet to feed its troops while they exercise in the area. Irrigation officials claim that even the legal outlet has been expanded illegally to draw more water. Driving along the canal, one can spot huge excavating machines and dumpers meant to dig the land and make outlets. Taking their cue from the army, others have also joined in the fray. The irrigation officials named some local politicians and professionals such as Asmatullah Niazi (district president, PML-Q), Iqbal Moghul (Naib Nazim, Liaquatpur), Iqbal Channar (MPA, PML-N), Professors Rafiq Minhas and Nazeer Khan, relatives of a local PPP politician, Col. (retd.) Naveed, and Brig. (retd.) S. M. Tiwana as some of those who steal water. But irrigation department officials contend that the army steals a larger share and poses a bigger problem. And unless they don’t stop this illegal practice, the civilians will continue to follow in their footsteps. Furthermore, civilian water thieves argue that they won’t stop until the army does the same. This makes it almost impossible for irrigation officials to stop anyone else. In any case, a lot of the civilians involved in stealing are well connected with the army.

Irrigation officials have tried their level best to put an end to this of water theft, but they lack the resources and the authority to contest the army’s involvement. The staff responsible for stopping such illegal practices comprises a sub-divisional officer (SDO), a mate and four baildars (agricultural labor). And they have no legal authority to arrest the offenders or take any action against them. The police, on the other hand, are reluctant to act because of fear and for administrative reasons. Since the area in question falls between two districts – Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan – it is usually not clear which DPO has jurisdiction to carry out the anti-theft operations. In any case, such administrative excuses are often used to hide the fact that no one wants to take on the army. A couple of years back, when an irrigation department officer tried to close one of the army’s illegal outlets, he was manhandled and kept in custody for 24 hours. Interestingly, the army has also forcibly taken over two irrigation rest houses at Maitla and Qasimwala. The provincial administration and the chief minister Punjab knows of the matter and was updated about the situation during his visit to the area in June/July 2008. Despite all information he just evaded the issue. The officials seemed especially unhappy with one army officer in charge of these operations, Major Manucheher Munawar Awan.

Filing complaints against such high-handedness is a tough job because these matters do not come under the jurisdiction of Bahawalpur Corps. Oddly enough such issues fall are under the administrative control of the Pannu Aqil Corps, which operates through an office at Bahadur Chowk, Rahimyar Khan. The area was abuzz with complaints about the high handedness of the major representing the Panu Aqil Corps.

Water theft, however, is part, or an extension of a bigger scam involving the army’s illegal occupation and use of state land. According to official records, the army has illegally occupied 99, 865 acres of Cholistan land and 5,000 acres belonging to the forest department. Moreover, the army has 2,07,992 acres legally leased to it by the provincial government for operational purposes such as for building firing ranges. A large chunk of the legally-leased land was given to the army in 1978. In the larger Bahawalpur division (Cholistan is part of Bahawalpur), the army only has ownership of about 8,700 acres that were sold to it out of which 8500 acres were purchased by the army to build the new cantonment in Bahawalpur city. However, the illegal acquisition of land and its illegal subletting started mainly after 1999. These activities coincided with the tenure of three army officers who were made in charge of the Cholistan Development Authority (CDA) and had the power to allocate land. The first one was a serving major general, S. Zaidi who served for a year to be followed by a retired major general Razzak and later a retired brigadier. Brig. (retd) Tiwana also acquired personal stake in the illegal subletting of the illegally occupied land. The brigadier is now a cultivator of hundreds of acres. The tenure of the three officers spanned nearly a decade 1999-2008.

A lot of the illegally occupied land is used for commercial purposes. According to official records, the army has illegally leased out 17, 063 acres of the illegally occupied land and 3,000 acres of its legally leased land. The subletting activity means leasing the land to big local landowners and businessmen of the area or non-locals who have acquired this land. In a lot of cases, land is leased out in the name of some senior army personnel who then sublet it to others. The illegal water outlets are meant to provide uninterrupted supply of water. It is a very clever scheme because the cultivators don’t have to pay any water rates or agricultural and other taxes levied by the provincial government. The land tends to be more productive then others because it is virgin land and has ample supply of water. The going rate in the area is Rs 35,000 per acre (this rate is common information for the local cultivators). However, there is no standard rate as far as the army is concerned. Depending on their level of acquaintanceship with the army, some lessees may pay a lower rental per acre. In any case, there is no transparency in this business and it is common knowledge that the actual rental income deposited in the Corps Commander’s special fund with the intention of being spend on soldier’s welfare is often less than the going rate. There is little transparency of the special fund which was established during Zia’s reign as an amount of money placed at the Corps Commander’s discretion for secret or special operations, or welfare of soldiers. When a local revenue officers raised questions about the subletting and rentals he was politely told to mind his own business as a lot of ‘big fish’ had stakes in the property.

So the business continues, no questions asked. The Poor Cholistanis are being deprived of their land and the farmers are being deprived water, creating major resentment among the locals against a state institution and the state itself.

Political Homosexuality

2010-07-23T19:21:00.000-07:00

Do political hijras look any different?

Can I suggest that politics is also highly gendered. Just like things fall in the category of masculine and feminine, political ideology also has its types. Considering my own bias for the feminine, I would argue that there are forces, which support the democratic process, and hence can be rated as feminine. Those that favor authoritarian-military rule fall in the category of masculine. In Pakistan's case there is yet another category of political heterosexuals. These are individuals or forces that might pretend to be feminine but are actually the other, or they tend to swing both ways. Therefore, politics has increasingly become the game played by political hijras (eunuchs) or heterosexuals.

To give an example a few weeks ago Farahnaz Isphani's company organized a show at the Pakistan National Council of Arts, Islamabad where the chief guest were the PM, Yusuf Raza Gillani and the now 'extended' army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. For those, who are not familiar with the lady, she is a PPPP parliamentarian and wife of Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, Hussain Haqqani. She was formerly a booker for CNN before getting a job with VoA which she had to leave because of the company's internal politics and her poor management. Anyway, the news is that this event happened exactly after her husband shook hands with the army chief.

This country and its politics seems to be a great example of political heterosexuality - everyone ready to bugger the other and offering their own service to the more powerful. Farahnaz's case is not new. The government's foreign minister falls in the same category. He seems pretty keen to become 'His Master's Voice'. Shah Mehmood Qureshi's recent letter to the UN in which he objected to the fingers raised by the international organization on the military and its intelligence agencies during investigation of Benazir Bhutto's murder is one of the many examples. Why should it surprise anyone at all? Its nothing new that the great sajjada nasheen has done. I remember a dinner party at the US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain's house in Islamabad. She had invited a few people for dinner including JI's Liaquat Baluch, the NRB fame Lt. General (retd) Tanveer Naqvi, Shah Mehmood Qureshi and a few others. I can't forget how pir sahib was singing praises of the devolution of democracy plan carved out by the general and making all efforts to make the general happy. "Oh it is a great program and we are making tremendous progress in strengthening of democracy" was the pir's refrain. He was then commanding the local government in Multan. It didn't matter that his party chief BB, who was then alive, did not agree with the devolution formula. In any case, the pir from Multan has this toothpaste or a traitor smile. The other examples being Zia-ul-Haq and the present head of the state. You don't know what are they hiding inside. But who cares? Shah Mehmood Qureshi wanted to save his little fiefdom in Multan. This puts him in the category of political eunuchs which means that they are not what we think they look like.

The pir sahib's political heterosexuality is, unfortunately, a manufacturing defect. He was born with it. He seems to have taken after his father Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi. While Sajjad Qureshi was the governor of Punjab General Zia, who was both the President and army chief then, happened to visit Lahore data darbar. As the dictator got out of the mausoleum Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi, who was also then the sajjada nasheen of a great shrine in Multan, put Zia's shoes in front of him with his own hands. This is called saving ones backside or knowing which side the bread is buttered, and then really applying lots of it on the toast . But its this over-obsession with saving the backside which turns a lot of politicians towards political heterosexuality. While they pretend to be for the democratic forces, there heart lies elsewhere. Moreover, this is not limited to the PPPP. Look at PML-N where the younger brother has been in bed with the military for a long time assisted by other political heterosexual like one particular chaudhry who actually looks like one in reality as well. Not to forget the PML-Q which is defined by its political heterosexuality. Deep-center, look at the great pir sahib of Pagara sharif who has played second fiddle to the GHQ. Interestingly, the pir sahib was quite powerful during Zia's regime and is held responsible for thwarting the procurement of newer Type-23 British frigates and supported the case for the old Type-21s. The pir sahib is related with pir Yusuf Raza Gillani, Makhdoom Ahmed Mehmood (PML-Q), Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi and other political stalwarts. Marriage was a great tool to connect European courts during the days of monarchical and feudal Europe. Dig a bit deeper and you will find familiar names - people involved in getting the Bhutto government of the 1970s in trouble by leaking secrets of dalai camp to the press, or the legal community working closely with the military. Some would like to say "is hamam mein sab nangey hein" (all in this bath are naked). This is not about nudity but about political sexual preference.

Nothing odd in this behavior except that the elites tend to service their interests first. Shah Mehmood Qureshi or other pirs like him represent a certain vested interest. Given Pakistan's patronage based political system, an individual politician's capability is gauged on his power to extract resources (all kinds) from the state. This formula does not produce democrats but hijras. 64 years after independence the patronage based political system has turned the tide in a way that civil-military relations must be carefully re-evaluated. There is now an abundance of political hijras and military hijras (these are military personnel pretending to be pro-democracy while they just use the concept to further their own political objectives. Most just want to remain in circulation through the media and the conference circuit and not die away like frogs).

Time to rethink the concept of the powerful establishment in Pakistan. Although it is a complex subject on which serious work was not done after the great sociologist Hamza Alavi or American political sociologist Stanley Kochanek (sadly both are now dead), I would like to lay down some basic perimeters of the country's power politics and contours of the establishment. First, as argued by well-respected authors like Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan's polity is really bureaucratic in nature. The state bureaucracy, from the early days, had a game plan for the state according to which politics, politicians and political parties were to be used to seek legitimacy from the public. This is also the reason that the military bureaucracy allows a civilian interlude every ten years. Also, it explains why the politicians tend not to learn from their past mistakes. Power, including electoral power, is always carefully manipulated. Most politicians understand that the electoral process is primed to meet the demands of the establishment except for in a post-crisis election. The formula is that every election after a crisis is likely to be fairer than the one held in relatively normal circumstances. For example, the 1970, 1988 and 2008 elections were comparatively fairer. In the absence of a crisis it is easier to distract the un-motivated voter to sift through the results.

Second, as Hamza Alavi argued, the state bureaucracy (civil and military) was meant to service the interests of the elite. I would argue that the over-concentration of power resulted in turning the civil and military bureaucracy into powerful stakeholders (for those interested in data-based analysis plz see Stanley Kochanek's book on Pakistan's Politics and Interest Groups). Third, at this juncture the establishment or the power elite is closely connected with each other through personal ties and shared interests and values. Just look at different powerful families. One example that quickly comes to mind is that of the Abida Hussain clan which has stakes in the political system, the media (through Najam Sethi/Jugnoo Mohsin group), business and industry (Syed Babur Ali), the military and the civil bureaucracy. Another angle - you will find members from the same family in different political parties as well as the state bureaucracy, the media, judiciary and other powerful groups. So, they tend to fight each other and use the conflict to gain legitimacy. This explains why the political leadership never managed to get rid of the army nor the army could ever succeed to bring about alternative leadership.

Therefore, I'd like to argue that the powerful establishment always comprises of a primary group which is aided by a secondary group of beneficiaries. Its the prime actors who form the core of the establishment. Since the birth of the country, there has been a lot of juggling between the primary and secondary players until the group began to consolidate its shape in the past couple of decades or more. A glance at the following table will give some idea about the partnership:

1947-54: (primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
   (secondary) TMs+PMIs+LC+Media

1954-71: (Primary) Mil+CB+LF+TIs+B&I
   (Secondary) LC+PMIs+Media

1971-77: (Primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
   (Secondary) Mil+B&I+LC+Media+PMIs

1977-88: (Primary) Mil+CB+PMIs
   (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+Media

1988-99: (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs
   (Secondary) LF+TIs+Media+LC

1999-01 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs+Media
   (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+NGOSec+ForExp

2001-08 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+PMIs
   (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC

2008-todate (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+LC
   (Secondary) LF+TIs+NGOSec+ForExp

LF = landed-feudal
Mil = Military
TMs = Trader-Merchant class
B&I = Business and Industry
CB = civil bureaucracy
LC = legal community (a glance at Kochanek's work will show that the legal community was always part of the power elite. They were included in the initial legislatures and played a more formal role in the form of the judiciary)
TIs = Traditional Islamiscts (pirs and sajjada nasheens)
PMIs = Post-modernist Islamiscts (religious right and religious warriors)
NGOSec = non-governmental sector
ForExp = Elite foreign expatriates that are increasingly becoming partners of the state bureaucracy and frequently channel money into military sponsored projects abroad. These connections are useful especially in terms of financing positions and endowments abroad that will service the interest of the bureaucracy.

A careful look at this power arrangement and you will notice how state bureaucracy has always been a member of the core/primary. This includes the Bhutto years when the military was resuscitating and the civil bureaucracy became tremendously powerful due to its expanded role in business and industrial management. Also, the media was always on board. The first paper Dawn had state-sponsership and its editorial was always close to the state including after the change from the right to left of center. Its just that the center (after 1971) was aligned with the left as well, or at least seemingly so. Then there was Pakistan Times, the Nawa-i-Waqt group, Massawat, etc. After its physical expansion the media has begun to play a more important role. While the ownership was always aligned with the establishment, especially state bureaucratic forces, in recent years the editorial has largely managed to align itself as well. No wonder, the pay commission issue is never resolved.

The problem with the above alignment is that the elite become myopic and predatory and begin to inadvertently destroy the state. They have managed to damage the nation-state and all we are now left with is the administrative-state. This structure results in generating a clogged-up political system reeking of stench because political power does not move around and is concentrated in a small space. Much to the dislike of my alleged leftist friends, the current fad of militancy is actually a result of the above-described political heterosexuality and muck. Violence is natural in a socio-polity where all legitimate means to re-negotiate power are dead or tightly-controlled. This is not to suggest that the Deobandi-Salafi-Wahabi jihadis are the future. They, of course, have a central place in the core group of the establishment and may partly replace the elite in different parts of the state, if not the entire country. But more important, they will prosper considering that the existing elite have mostly seemed to turn into bloody hijras. I would like to apologize from the actual physical hijras because they may have more balls in them than their political counterparts.

Ps: If you think the above table needs modification, plz suggest and lets have a good discussion. An analysis of the sociology of power politics is crucial for understanding the country's political future.

Ludwig von Rochau's Children

2010-06-20T01:29:00.000-07:00

Ludwig von Rochau was a German gent, a 19th century writer and politicians responsible for formulating the theory of realpolitik. The idea is about the state using Machiavellian tactics to expand its power. The theory is extremely state centric. I suspect the German really must have come and settled in South Asia because we have ample supply of people who subscribe to this theory. I suppose as the Punjabis would put it our realpolitik buffs must share their nani (maternal grandmother) with the German especially Rochau.

This preamble was meant to express my surprise at the fact that so many of the educated people, especially from media and academia, seem so enamored by realpolitik. Very recently had a chance to look at journalist Aamir Ahmed Khan's article in Express Tribune titled: 'India is not to blame" (http://tribune.com.pk/story/22465/india-is-not-the-problem/). The main thesis of the author was that the present Pakistani civilian government is hopeless and has voluntarily given up the option to run its foreign and security policy, and that the Taliban were being created by Indian RAW. I immediately sat down to jog my memory about the last time GHQ ever allowed any political government to run either the security or foreign policies. Or is it that Aamir Ahmed Khan, who runs BBC Urdu, has joined the bandwagon of those who believe things will improve dramatically only if Asif Ali Zardari and his personal clowns would leave. What goes without saying that he probably considers these other clowns as trustworthy. Not surprised. In fact, I was reminded of a conversation I had with the author way back in 2007 just a couple of days before my book military inc was launched in Islamabad. I had gone to invite him for the event and he had kindly offered to take copies of the book to Generals Pervez Musharraf and Ehsan. At that time, Mr Khan was quite close to General Ehsan and remains so.

More recently, another good journalist known for his mastery over a European language was in the American capital. He was found telling friends about how Pakistan army was ready to and engaged in cleaning the country up of all these unsavory Taliban and militants. The proof? His meetings with General Asfaq pervez Kiyani which normally run into a few hours. The gent was of the opinion that the shortest meeting was three-and-a-half hours and only when he requested the good general to wrap up. Does it surprise anyone why the army doesn't do so well in battles? If its general spends hours explaining or educating a journalist then where does he find the time for his own men and operations!

But then there has been a transformation of the military over so many years. This is no longer a professional force particularly from the objective of fulfilling the task of protecting the state from external threat or drawing out and implementing successful military operations. However, it has done better in saving its own image and managing things politically. Its senior officers are successful public relations guys who know the art of developing rapport with journalists or using the media to their own advantage. Just look at the present army chief who appears to use his own charms, besides deploying the ISPR, ISI and SPD combine, to turn the tide in his favor. The long meetings with our journalist friend are not driven by some altruistic designs. The good general wants to convince the world that he is on top of things when it comes to fighting militancy. Such an image helps convince policymakers abroad of the dire need to retain General Kiyani as Pakistan army's service chief.

This is not to suggest that it all revolves around the issue of the general's extension. However, it feeds into that plot as well. There are three options that are being discussed. First, the general gets an extension. The problem is that he may get it because the American are interested in such an eventuality (apparently, Mike Mullen does not even hear anything against Kiyani in private meetings), but that it may give an impression of Kiyani being an over-ambitious general. Second, he gets elevated to the position of an up-graded position of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It may not be too favorable an option in the GHQ. Third, extension in the term of the army chief from 3 to 5 years. There are strong rumors with journalists like Najam Sethi supporting such possibility. The good general is indeed extremely smart and intelligent. If Machiavelli were to chose an heir it might be our good commander. After all, this army is trained to produce those that pursue the principle of realpolitik.

A Facebook Party

2010-05-26T12:05:00.000-07:00

This looks like a season for setting up alternative political parties in and for Pakistan. While some are struggling inside the country to revamp the existing structures or create new ones, others are trying to setup new parties outside.

In Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F got members of the alliance of religious parties together to revamp it in preparation for the next elections. Similarly, some people have proposed setting up a party of eunuchs in the country. They intend to field candidates in every constituency with the brief message that “we will not make any promises that we cannot fulfill. Others cannot fulfill promises either but we admit that we cannot. All we say is field honest candidates. If you cannot find any then vote for us”. A very clear and crisp message! Even more commendable is the fact that these people made an effort to pose as an alternative despite the socio-cultural bias of the society towards eunuchs. Inherent prejudice was a reason that actress Musarrat Shaheen, who was brave enough to contest elections against Maulana Fazlur Rehman, could not win from Dera Ismail Khan.
However, it is truly appreciable that the eunuchs thought of finding an alternative internally when former dictators like Pervez Musharraf are busy scouting out people in the UK and the US who could bank-roll his political movement in Pakistan. Recently, I had a chance to go to one of the events organized from the forum of ‘Pakistan First’ established and managed by the former head of the Pakistan Cricket Board, Naseem Ashraf. Although the media was asked to come to the event, it was just for a post-meeting briefing by the former dictator. The main event was a private meeting in which he hoped to rope in some of the rich professional expatriate Pakistanis with a desire to make a dent in the politics of the country of their birth. The idea behind calling the press was to show-off that the former general had sufficient support amongst the Pakistani community.
But not everyone invited to the party was a confirmed supporter. Many were there to hear what he had to offer. There were others like an entrepreneur from Philadelphia and another one from Washington state who seemed keen to invest their money in the general. They looked impressed with Musharraf’s facebook following which the former dictator touted happily just like he used to cite the figures of mobile phones and motor-cycle purchase in the Pakistan he ruled as a sign of economic progress. Little did he know that spurious consumption goes up also in non-performing economies.
Sadly, numerous rich and influential Pakistani expats believe they can parachute into the country’s politics or bankroll potential politicians and thus gain a political foothold. Although the old dictator claimed he would hold elections in the party, he claimed he would initially nominate office-bearers. Most important, he did not offer any idea or agenda to attract people to the party. Every question was answered with a ‘we will tell when the time comes’ kind of a slogan.
It looked like a political reconnoitering mission in the US. Reportedly, Musharraf did a better job of speaking then his handlers in the US like Naseem Ashraf. Not to mention the fact that Ashraf was one of the better lot. There were others who seemed to be representing the MQM. While talking to those present, these rather dubious gentlemen claimed that they lived in the US only on Musharraf’s orders. They had returned to Pakistan but returned on the former dictator’s insistence. When asked by people if he did nothing but move around on Musharraf’s beck and call, the gent insisted that he had a life and was happily married. The same gent also claimed Musharraf’s innocence in signing the NRO saying that nothing moved in Pakistan without orders from Washington.
This particular gentleman, who was part of a gang of three, represented a dubious organization called Pak-American Communication which cannot be found on the web. Someone claimed that the people might have represented the MQM. In that case, the only possibility is that there is some wedge within the MQM that Musharraf plans to benefit from. There are educated people within the ethnic party not happy being pide-pippered by Altaf Hussain.
Thus far, the former dictator does not even have a name for his political party. Perhaps, ‘The Facebook’ Party or ‘Made in the US’ might be an appropriate name.

Published in the Express Tribune, May 23rd, 2010.

State-of-the-art Dumbness in DC

2010-05-18T20:49:00.000-07:00

Just met a young aspiring Pakistani mediademic in Washington, DC. He was searching for a way to enter and then make it big in DC's think-tank circle. His presumption was that being from the Frontier province of Pakistan, which borders on the tribal areas and is extremely sell able in the US, he could make an entry into the world of regional experts. He seemed a bit confused as he mumbled something about doing independent research. Little did he realize that the experts in Washington, DC don't care about independence but about who has better information and contacts in the government to sell. Resultantly, every so called Pakistan expert in the US, especially in DC, owns a couple of Pakistani general if not more. Not surprisingly, one Pakistani army brigadier FK, who was connected with the nuclear establishment during the early days of Musharraf and is also related to the former Pakistani army chief, decided to sell himself to an American expert of sorts who currently is big in American intelligence setup. In return Brig. FK got himself a nice house in California.

Pity, the young man didn't understand the trick of trade in Washington, DC, or, perhaps, I failed to gauge his capabilities. But he represented the cross-breed (of course illegal) between a media person and an academic. These are the new generation of media persons imagining themselves as academics or academics hoping to get famous overnight. As a result one gets this terrible combination which results in the travesty of the noble art followed by Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Khuldoon and many others. In short, the world, especially South Asia is full of such public intellectuals or mediademics. This category seriously believes it can change the world.

But that is a separate debate which we'll continue later. For the time being, wanted to tell you about my conversation with this aspiring mediademic about finding a niche in the US. My suggestion to him was to look at some other geographic area for study especially if he wanted to study issues pertaining to national security. A mediademic cannot develop independent expertise because he/she is too eager to become a public figure and seeks quick info which can only be sought through those who have control of sensitive segments of the state. So, the option is to engage with those who control information or develop expertise which takes time which a mediademic definitely does not have.

All states control information on national security and Pakistan is catching up to the game very fast. Traditionally, media persons and academics in Pakistan did not have the ready access so people made wild guesses about the military but did not have sufficient information. An opening to national security issues started to be provided as a result of post-Kargil Musharrafian glasnost. This meant that a new breed of mediademics was to be created both be design and default. The design lay in the fact that information was released selectively to trusted people and default means that such a category of public intellectuals got created because such people thought they knew better than everyone else. The state created an interconnected structure comprising of: (a) ISI, (b) ISPR, and (SPD - Strategic Plans Division).

Headed by a brash three-star, the ISI reaches out to people. The three-start talks about John Adams and political philosophy with people over a glass of whiskey. WoWW.... how impressive. It certainly gets the enlightened moderates. Then there is the lovely ISPR which is deeply entrenched in the media through familial relations. The general has a network of family members spread all over (thank godness for mothers who produced more than one child!). Now, even the Gen. ISPR son is getting trained to join the media and is happily using one of the English dailies to polish the art of a mediademic. Not to forget retired military mediademics who are an informal subsidiary of the ISPR. These old generals, who are good at flirting as well as being prominent, ensure defense of military's interests.

But the SPD takes the cake. The organization was set up as the secretariat of the National Command Authority and is in the business of nuclear weapons management. However, given that they have a lot of time and are headed by another 'ants-in-pants' kind of general, the SPD team does a lot of things including making of intellectual missiles, upgrading intellectual missiles to ballistic missile category and searching for intellectual nuclear fissile material. Its head General Kidwai's men can be seen around town in Islamabad and in international academic circuits in their Armani suits flirting reasonably with both men and women and scouting out potential partners at home and abroad.

Nationally (within Pakistan) it always helps if you are an attractive, young female with a flair for foreign clothing, long hair and lots of charms. The SPD can set you up in your independent shop or help you find a career in one of the many national think-tanks. Today, there is not a single young scholar who is not linked with the SPD in one shape of form. The civilians are being trained as junior partners until the time that military personnel in the SPD get trained and retired so they could take positions in the media. The organization even approves setting up of foreign NGOs in the country. Recently, the head of an American foundation, which was opening office in Islamabad, was advised to have a friendly tete-a-tete with one of the Armani-suited SPD gents. The meeting was meant for seeking common understanding. Technically, the approval for setting up an NGO comes from the Economic Affairs Division (EAD). But EAD is more like a figurehead. The matters are actually controlled by the SPD.

This is a highly evolved structure due to which military has managed to completely penetrate the media and academia. Retired and/or a few serving military personnel along with civilian partners can be found in all organizations. The establishment has now control editorial of all media outlets.

But the more interesting scam pertains to Pakistan's ISI-ISPR-SPD intellectual combine making in-roads in the US capital. Since America never had an expertise on Pakistan due to its temporary interest in its South Asian ally, American experts have never looked at the country beyond their own security needs. So, Washington really doesn't have experts which is to Islamabad's advantage. So, the military has happily tried to create space to its advantage by injecting its own people, buying budding experts and co-opting big names who are non-experts.

In the first case, three-and-a-half people were injected into American academic circle. There is one highly connected woman who was injected with the help of friendly financiers. These are military's clients, who are mainly expatriates or the corporate sector that, in any case, is friendly with the military. They fund the project of bringing GHQ-friendly people to other countries. The other is a gent from a well-known military family who briefs American regarding the benefits of trusting the military rather than the political forces in Pakistan. A third is a new entrant inserted at almost entry level in a think-tank, who worked as a consultant with the SPD, and probably continues to be one. The half, of course, is a Pakistani mediademic injected into an American university. The reason he is considered as half is because his job is limited to defending the military's credentials as the US's partner in the war on terror.

The second category relates to young Pak-American budding mediademics. One chap, who is well placed in American military think-tank, sells the military in Washington (it must be mentioned that he doesn't market Pakistan but just the GHQ). He is so well-entrenched in Pakistan army's system that he was even party to getting his sibling married off to a Kashmiri leader. How cooperative! The reward is get access to Pak military officers. This helps the chap build his credibility at home and retain his job in his think tank. For those who understand the doggy-dog world of capitalist society, they will understand the significance of retaining a job.

The third category is of old experts who are wined and dined on their trips to Pakistan. This is called co-option which means show carefully and take out the stickiest portions while revealing the rest. This also shows a change in attitude. The military does not hide everything any more. It allows for some criticism as long as the end result is that people's belief in the army is restored.

No wonder if some think that the war on terror is a tough fight for the US to survive.

Zia's Children

2010-05-17T22:44:00.000-07:00

Sunday, April 05, 2009
By Ayesha Siddiqa

As the entire Pakistani nation watches video footage of a 17-years-old
girl screaming on their television screens during the process of her
torture at the hands of the brutal Taliban in Swat, one wonders if the
mothers, sisters, daughters and the male members of this nation will
ever take time out to think about this system of justice advocated by
these men who are not even qualified to interpret the Quran and Sunnah.

How did these men know that she had committed adultery? Or were
the men in Iran, who ran a jeep over both the arms of a young boy to
punish him for stealing sure about his economic circumstances?
Sadly, all this will be justified in certain quarters as upholding of
Sharia. But the legal system of any land is meant to do justice
which is not just the application of some legal norms, but the
application of law in conjunction with sensitivity towards the
economic, social and political conditions of a place.

The application of Sharia is extremely complex as it entails a
stringent mechanism for evidence. For instance, a witness has to
meet certain conditions. The witness has to be one: (a) who has
never been punished for any crime, (b) has always said all his
prayers in time, (c) never urinated standing up, (d) never eaten from
a market place, (e) never committed any major sin, (f) never
committed any minor sin, and
(g) never failed to carry out obligations prescribed by Quran and
Sunnah. These conditions are so stringent that according to Pakistan's
former Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah even he would not qualify
to be a witness.

Referring to the case of the girl flogged in Swat, the fact of the
matter is that this is one example of the dire conditions of women
in a large number of Muslim societies where there is no legal system
for this particular gender to prove their innocence. In Pakistan in
particular where the Hudood laws were formulated under the Zia
regime, the objective was not to bring justice in the society but to
throttle all forms of justice. In this respect, the Taliban in Swat and
those who ruled Afghanistan for some time are Zia'children. They
use force arbitrarily and apply laws without the real context to
enhance their own power.

For those, who think of General Ziaul Haq as an exemplary
marde momin, it would be beneficial to read Tahir Wasti's seminal
work --- Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharia
in Practice". The book published in January this year and authored
by a man, who has experience of both Islamic law and British common
law, is the first detailed research enlisting the ramifications of the
application of sharia law in Pakistan. The writer argues that Zia's
decision to impose Nizam-e-Islam on February 2 1979 was not a
sincere act. Wasti, in fact, argues that had the military dictator been
sincere he would have also invoked the law of Qisas and Diyat as
part of his Islamic regulations that mainly consisted of the five laws
pertaining to: drinking, Zina (adultery), Zakat and usher, highway
robbery, and theft. The punishment for some of these crimes is not
even prescribed in the Quran.

The reason that Zia left out Qisas and Diyat, which finally became an
ordinance in 1990 during Benazir Bhutto's government and finally
passed as a law after twenty minutes of debate in parliament
under Nawaz Sharif was because he was too eager to hang Bhutto.
Such a law would not have allowed for the approver Masood
Mehmood, which, in turn, means that Bhutto could not have
been sentenced to death.

Not surprisingly, Bhutto had filed a review petition number 5-R of
1979 on 13/02/1979 in the Supreme Court asking that his case be
tried under Sharia or Nizam-e-Islam through first invoking the law
on Qisas and Diyat. Notwithstanding the fact that while in power
Bhutto himself played to the gallery by using religion, in case of
his trial his plea to use the religious law was primarily as a legal
point that would technically stop the Zia government from sentencing
him to death. Interestingly, as Wasti points out in his book, Zia kept
returning the draft of this law until he had managed to put Bhutto
to death. The Supreme Court justices gave a split decision on the
Bhutto case arguing on page 29 of the decision of the said review
petition that under section 302 of the PPC read with section 109 of
the PPC, this was a case of unintentional murder in which there was
no room for the witness of an approver. The decision including the
said review petition by Bhutto is reported in PLD 1979 Supreme
Court 741 and the two volumes on "Bhutto's Trial Documents"
published by Justice Afzal Haider.

Zia's government also challenged other cases in which such a law
needed implementation. Unfortunately, the author states, it were
judges like Justices Tanzeel-ur-Rehman and Afzal Cheema who
helped Zia cheat the entire country by bringing about amendments
in the sharia law that suited the military dictator's interests and
allowed him not to pass the law on Qisas and Diyat as long as he was alive.

What is even sadder is that such discrepancy in Nizam-e-Islam
was never seriously challenged by any quarters. Even after the Qisas
and Diyat law came into force, first as an ordinance, and later, as
law, no one really pointed out the problem in invoking the said law.
As Wasti points out in his book, since it is difficult to find a witness,
the law of Qisas was never implemented and the government
basically uses tazeer or diyat to pass judgments. Diyat allows for
compromise in case of murder, a law which was framed not to bring
peace and justice in the society according to religious principles,
but to suit the interests of the more powerful. There are cases
after cases reported in Wasti's book in which poor and weak
people were forced to accept a compromise and forgive the
murderers of their loved ones. The law even encouraged
exchange of women as part of a settlement. Reportedly, since
the law came into force some judges showed their magnanimity
by ordering the payment of blood-money in addition to exchange
of women. Interestingly, the system was never fully challenged
by the legal community due to what senior lawyer and now
human rights activist Iqbal Haider termed, on the floor of
parliament in 1990, as greed of the legal community. This law
permits lawyers to claim their fee without putting in effort that
they would otherwise have to do to in defense of their clients.

The screams of the young Swati girl are the knock on the door of
the entire society to wake up and not allow these men and others
like them, who are at best Zia's children in terms of their sense
of legal fairness, to bring violence in this country in the name
of religion. This is not just about better treatment of women but
also a matter of justice for all and peace and tranquility in the
society. What is being presented as sharia is in reality a system
that protects the unquestioned power of those who have monopoly
over violence and resources in the society. A legal system is an
ever-evolving process that needn't mimic the past without taking
into account the circumstances. In the words of Maulana Amin
Ahsan Aslahi, religion of the past is history of the present which
can only be used as a good reference point and no more.

The writer is an Islamabad-based social scientist and author
of Military Inc. Email: ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

Did Hamid Mir have a Conversation with the TTP?

2010-05-16T08:54:00.000-07:00

The Story
A popular Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir is caught on audio talking to a member of a Taliban group popularly known as the TTP. http://criticalppp.org/lubp/archives/10918
Mir and his friends blame the Zardari government especially the Punjab (largest province of Pakistan) governor Salman Taseer for a conspiracy since his paper publish the story. Here's my analysis:

Is the man conversing with, whats alleged as a member of the Punjabi Taliban, Hamid Mir? The simple answer is yes. The man in the tape is Hamid Mir beyond doubt. The voice and style of conversation is his. I have had conversations with him on several occasions and he breaks stories in this very style. The conversation should not surprise people as Hamid Mir has old links with the Islamiscts and the intelligence agencies. In the world of the armed forces information is difficult to access. Relatively better access to information comes at a price which Hamid Mir and many other journalists in the world, particularly Pakistan pay happily. There is not a single journalist, especially on the electronic media who comments on national security and is not fed by the military. I remember one very popular journalist who even writes for foreign press. He is considered an authority on military affairs. The poor chap cannot tell the front of a submarine from its back. Planting people in the media and intelligentsia is an old trick. The only matter of concern really is that how and why is the audio recording made available on the net? The real story is the disclosure rather than the conversation.

This telephone conversation could have been tapped by several intelligence sources including the ISI, MI and IB and the question is which one leaked it and why. Is there anything interesting happening between the PPP government and Hamid Mir due to which the conversation was leaked? The other possibility is that one of the army-run agency leaked it. The first explanation is that they wanted to deflect attention from themselves on Hamid Mir. It seems from the conversation as if Mir caused Khalid Khwaja's death by instigating the alleged Punjabi Taliban. The insistence on KK's links with Ahmedis and Americans could do the trick of inciting the Taliban against KK. But I am sure that was not Hamid Mir's intent. He was just trying to show-ff to the Taliban the superiority of his information. Such show-off comes with the territory that he operates in. But the conversation was then conveniently leaked so that it may appear as something in which the intelligence agencies had no involvement thats is in the killing of KK.

The other explanation is that the conversation indicates some chasm within the intelligence establishment. The conversation basically signifies the presence of multiple groups within the intelligence agencies. There are, at least, three ideological groups within the agencies: (a) the Islamiscsts, (b) the pro-West, and (c) pro-China. These groups exert influence and lobby for their perspective. This means that the flow of information to the top brass is conditioned by the ideological bias of the groups. The information-intelligence is then measured against the policy perspective of the top leadership of the army. Thus, Hamid Mir is not the only journalist working for the agencies. There are others as well. The case in point pertains to that of a female journalist who is dealt with by the external security wing of the ISI. Each ISI division has its own set of journalists. This lady was eventually encouraged by the agencies and the army chief to build familial links with Indian politician through marriage. Her marriage with a famous Indian political figure was made in the GHQ.

But going back to Hamid Mir, his conversation reflects the bias of Pakistan's establishment. There is nothing which he says that is annoying by the establishment's standards. The state has a bias against its minorities which reflects in the conversation. Lets not forget that the Hamid Mir conversation is just the end result of years of Jamaat's infiltration in the establishment. It were during the Zia years (1977-81) that more than 800 changes were made in the text books by a board that pre-dominantly represented the Jamaat. Today, the establishment is essentially Islamisct. The dealings with the US or even China reflect the military's utilitarian approach. It will happily use any of these states to build itself. Most countries behave this way. The name of the game is realpolitik which focuses on power of the state rther than power of the people. The Pakistani state had begun to steer towards Islamism at a very early stage after its creation. Naturally, the ideology rubbed on different elements in the society as well. This is what we can see in Hamid Mir's conversation.

Khalid Khwaja was always with the ISI. He may have been steered by the pro-West elements within the ISI to negotiate some deals with the TTP. There are also rumors that during one of his previous visits, he was suspected of planting an intelligent devise for the US to locate one of the TTP leaders. The discussion of his involvement in misleading Maulana Abdul Aziz does not make sense because Abdul Aziz led his funeral prayers. There is something that doesn't make sense in the story. Whats more important to remember are that the jihadis (aka Pakistani Taliban) are well-entrenched in Pakistan's intelligence system and even its establishment. No wonder, Pakistan's courts have been acquitting jihadis like Lashkare Jhangavi's Malik Ishaq. Recently, the courts acquitted those accused of involvement in the Marriott bombing case and the suicide attack against Lt. general Mushtaq Baig. These decisions could have been changed if the agencies were willing to sort out the jihadis. The segment within the agencies which supports jihad and jihadis has now strengthened. The army and its intelligence agencies now have a dependence on these jihadis. The questions which many ask is that why get their men killed. This is nothing new. There was similar friction in the case of the Algerian military and the Islamiscts. The reason that this particular battle in Pakistan is contained to a few people is because of the influence of the Islamiscts on the army.

(see: http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=28677
and http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/16-court+acquits+nine+terror+suspects-hs-05)

Whats Up in Pakistan Army's GHQ?

2010-05-13T07:34:00.000-07:00

One Karachi based Mr Seagul has been writing on the issue of higher defense management especially the comparative powers of the army chief versus that of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee. In a recent article the said gent proposed that the Chairman JCSC should get the power to sit on the promotion board and become part of the decisions to post senior officers. This, he believes, is meant to make a toothless Chairman powerful vis-a-vis the most powerful army chief. Whats happening here as our friend Mr Seagul is not known for doing things without being prompted from the 'inside.' Its not that he is a great intellectual when it comes to military matters. In fact, if some one insists on arguing that the article does not indicate a conspiracy then it will be fair to say that Seagul picked up this argument regarding the empowerment of the CJCSC from a common friend based in NYC who has far superior knowledge of the military than Soldier Seagul could (don't forget that he was unceremoniously removed from the military due to his incompetence. He argues that this was done to him because of his mother being Bengali. The argument has earned him good links in the Bangladeshi security sector and allows Seagul to claim at home that the Bangladeshi armed forces will happily become an appendage to the Pak mil whenever the need arises).

Anyway, back to the question of what's happening. Pakistan's JCSC was established in 1976 as a result of an intellectual process started by the Bhutto government. The idea was to de-fang the army chief through empowering the other two service chiefs and making another four-start general. The Chairman JCSC was responsible for joint planning, etc. However, the fact that the new 4-star general had no troops to command made him as powerless as a transvestite. The imposition of martial law in 1977 ruined any possibility of the institution building up. General Mohammad Sharif, who was the first Chairman, complained that Zia-ul-Haq, who then became the President as well, killed the new organization. The fact that Lt. General KM Arif being the vice chief of army sat in the meetings to represent the chief was a travesty of the basic principle of equality between the three services that the JCSC was supposed to bring.

The army never liked the concept of the JCSC and tried to destroy it whenever it got an opportunity to do so. Not only that the Chairman JCSC was never consulted in the planning of major operations like Kargil, the army under Musharraf killed another principle of the head of JCSC to be appointed in rotation from all the three services. Honestly, Nawaz Sharif was the first one to dishonor this principle as he was the one who appointed Musharraf as the Chairman JCSC instead of the naval chief Fasih Bokhari just to buy some time from the army. Sharif thought he could appease Musharraf who had already declared his intent to go after the blood of Sharif brothers since he appointed his own favorite as the corps commander 10th corps which is responsible for most trouble-making coup-making activity. During the days after Musharraf's take over, the internal army think tank produced papers supporting the idea of scraping the JCSC. Later, the idea was not entertained since the organization served the purpose of accommodating one army general without causing too many problems for the army chief and his empire.

But every now and then, the army toys with the idea of empowering the JCSC. The first time it happened was under General Mirza Aslam Beg. Since the then newly elected government of Benazir Bhutto had announced a few months in advance its choice of the next army chief - Asif Nawaz Junjua - Beg did not hope to get an extension and so he floated the idea of empowering the JCSC. Beg hoped that he could then lobby the political government to make him the Chairman. But he had to first convince his gang of 9+ generals to support an internal organizational change. His efforts were carefully and successfully blocked by the incoming army chief. Reports have it that General Junjua had the army chief's office carefully bugged with the help of the then DG MI Javed Ashraf Qazi and the chief's military secretary Brig. Zia-ud-Din But (the Nawaz Sharif fame). The idea was to keep an eye on Beg's moves and push him out.

Now, the question is between Kiyani's extension as army chief or his nomination as the Chairman JCSC. The army chief's office is feeding its favorite journalists to plant stories arguing a case for Kiyani's extension. However, the decision depends on three factors: (a) agreement within the GHQ, (b) support of the political government, and (c) nod from Washington, DC. Since Kiyani is the chief and knows how to work the internal ropes because of his tenure with the ISI, the first is not a major issue. The second can be slightly problematic due to bad blood between the PPP and the army. All efforts are being made to keep the PPP leadership on its toes. Not that the PPP government is efficient but the trouble on the streets could partly be artificial as well (in the spirit of keeping them anxious as long as a favorable decision regarding extension is not made). The army chief seems good on the third score except that the New York Time Square bombing plot may not bring him a lot of luck (it is also possible that Soldier Seagul might be touting this idea because his friends in Washington want him to argue for rationalizing the army's power structure so that the war on terror could be fought better. After all, Soldier Seagul has a sharp nose for money and other benefits, and has little problem selling his tender soul). The US will only support Kiyani if he is considered as their man in Rawalpindi with the intent and capacity to deliver. However, if any of the three equations go wrong then Kiyani wants to play it safe and move to the position of the Chairman JCSC but not without some empowerment. general Kiyani is not interested in sticking his neck out for the military unless he is in a relatively powerful position. The powerless Chairman can only get some capacity if he begins to sit on the posting and promotion board of the military, especially the army. It goes without saying that Mr Seagul will not be caught with his pants down making such an argument in case Kiyani gets an extension. The general will not want anyone to challenge his authority as army chief. But if he is not in the 'hot-seat' he would want the organizational story to be written differently.

The golden principle in the armed forces is that the top brass takes care of its interests first. We are in May 2010 which means 7 months away from Kiyani's retirement. Obviously, the General does not want to take chances and is deploying all tactics and resources, especially in the media, to build his case. the other golden rule is beware of North Punjabis. They are always sharp politicians. As for these 'inner court' battles, lets watch which side the sun rises!

Obituary of a Democrat

2010-05-12T11:48:00.000-07:00

HH will be remembered for his services to Pakistan's democracy. His voice is missed in today's Washington, DC and its academic circles. Indeed, HH was in American capital speaking for democratic forces at a time when no one would commit themselves to speaking out for what Pakistan and its people deserve. I still cannot forget the evenings in 2004-05 when HH had still not managed to elevate himself to the position of an ambassador and was engaged in writing his seminal work on Pakistan's military and its links with the militants. Artfully, he would utter poetic verses of famous Urdu poets punctuated by theoretical jargon to explain how he arrived at his important conclusion that the army was in bed with the Taliban and jihadis. Of course, HH is a man of monologues, but in the company of veteran journalist Khalid Hassan, he would often give others the chance to speak. Probably, the art of creating a dialogue belonged to KH rather than HH. At that time in history, HH seemed like a person close to unearthing a treasure which, indeed, his book turned out to be. "Pakistan - Mosque to Military" is a seminal work which may not be produced again, especially not by him. The smooth prose, the readability of the narrative and the facts provided in those pages make the book more than just and account of what Pakistan's military had done to the country. The organization, as HH pointed out, had since long been engaged with religious zealots and used them to fight its battles.

HH believed that his work would contribute to the struggle by democractic forces to push back the dictatorial dispensation of General Pervez Musharraf. HH had happily embraced the Pakistan People's Party's victory in the 2008 elections as the great success of democracy. For him, Benazir Bhutto's death in December 2007 did not matter since the ultimate joy was that she had managed to make her party transit to democracy. This is what HH and many of his friends in Pakistan and in the US called transition to democracy. I remember meeting him on February 19th 2008 for the recording of Shehryar Azhar's program for ARY on the post-election scenario in Pakistan (if Husein was the prophet of transitional politics Azhar was his Khalifa. Between the two it was claimed that elections represented the change Pakjistan was waiting for). During that meeting Husein thumped his own back and chest claiming that his predictions had indeed come true - Benazir Bhutto managed to force Musharraf to shed his uniform and win the elections. It didn't matter for the ambassador that she had paid with her own life for this transition to happen.

Later, HH became the great ambassador of this transitional democracy. It didn't matter that the structural problems in Pakistan's politics continued such as the excessive power of the military, the comparative weakness of political institutions and myopia of the combined civil-military ruling elite of the country. The plan was to use American pressure to push back the military in Pakistan. One worried for the life and security of this diplomatic cow-boy especially after the GHQ in Rawalpindi managed to get rid of its own child General Mehmoud Ali Durrani as National Security Advisor. The Kerry-Lugar bill was the high point of HH - the democrat. This was the best he could achive. But it also invoked the wrath of the top brass. The GHQ was extremely upset and made sure it overturned the famous 'transition to democracy'. Besides other measures, HH's franchise for marketing Pakistan's democratic forces in the US was seriously threatened by GHQ's shadow ambassadors in Washington. One is a professional turncoat female diplomat and the other is a relative of an army chief-turned-author. Both are assisted in the US capital, albeit indirectly, by several menial researchers of Pakistani and American descent. The entire team of head honchos and menials combined tries to change American minds and convince them that military is the best thing which has happened to Pakistan. Given that most want to be ambassador in Washington, DC their loyalty to the GHQ and efficiency in marketing the khakis cannot be underestimated. While the lady continues to be busy cultivating relations in Washington so that she could take the most coveted position at some future date, the gent has also emerged as a wannabe. He even got a defense-analyst-for-hire reputed as one of many military's trumpets to write op-eds suggesting that the wannabe should be made the ambassador instead. The military trumpet, who is reputed to pimp for the GHQ, US government and many others depending on who can pay a good price was even invited to an American think tank by the gent as a reward for writing a favorable article. Surely, the lady was not happy with such a move. The said gent spends all his time pontificating about the influence and stability of the military in Pakistan. At the US think-tank the trumpet spoke about turning Islamabad into Dhaka.

Suddenly, the skies of American capital city seemed full of vultures hovering around to search the dead body of a diplomat they could chew on. Things became extremely dramatic as it was a matter of survival. For our friend HH, the choice was between killing the democrat to save the diplomat or vise versa. Obviously, the choice was to save the diplomat which was the logical thing to do in a Washington DC where policymakers and the human-terrain type academics stick to a set recipe for democracy out of the political cookbook. HH the diplomat could hear the sound of the boots marching to Washington and it was best to put the democrat to sleep. And so one evening those present at the occasion of the reception hosted at the Pakistan embassy, Washington, DC in honor of the foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani also witnessed the funeral of Husein the democrat.

Those of us, who care about democracy and politics in Pakistan, will remember the man for his services. He was a charming salesman whose presence will be missed in Washington where there is now hardly anyone to sing a song of and for the democratic forces in Pakistan. The vultures are still hovering above searching for bits and pieces of flesh and bones of the democrat. The spirit will probably be in some pain at the moment but will soon vanish from where it may not be recalled. The services of HH the democrat will always be remembered.

May his soul rest in peace.

Mapping the establishment – by Ayesha Siddiqa

2010-04-08T20:21:00.000-07:00

January 15th, 2010

As the battle rages between the political government and its rival, popularly known as the establishment, the public silently awaits the final result.
For some, the civilian government has already lost because its capacity to influence policymaking or make decisions without interference has diminished. National security, foreign policy and all strategic decisions are not being made in the presidential palace anymore.
One of the key indicators of this is that the president has deviated from the alternative vision in terms of regional politics and certain other issues that he initially pursued. Now, it is back to the establishment’s agenda, something he needs to do to buy time for his personal survival.
However, incapacitating the president from a policymaking and administrative perspective does not seem to satisfy the establishment which has gone for the PPP leadership’s jugular. The top man of the party has to go at all costs. Even if he survives the onslaught for a while or until the end of his legal term, he would have bled profusely.
This is not a new battle. It has been going on between different individuals versus the establishment for over 50 years. The difference lies in the various actors’ ability to stomach a fight and juggle the different players to survive. It’s a battle fought in space and time.
Why is the establishment so powerful? Because of its character and ability to develop meaningful partnerships. Most people think of the establishment as the military only. This is not wholly correct. But considering the dominance of the defence services neither is such a perception altogether misplaced.
The establishment is not a static entity. It has evolved over the years with newer members joining in and becoming more significant than others. However, a distinction must be made between the core, peripheral and associate members. It is the core members that moderate and control the dynamics of the establishment while the peripheral ones provide support to the system without determining the direction of the working of the establishment. The associate members are taken on board when the need arises.
The core members include senior members of the military and civil bureaucracies, select politicians, media houses and some key economic players. While the military and civil bureaucracies are easier to identify because they have a formal organisational shape and well-defined institutional interests, other actors such as politicians and the media are not so easily captured.
There are some politicians whose primary job it is to watch out for the interests of the establishment and tip the balance within their respective parties in favour of the establishment in case there is any threat to its interests. Each party has such members. So, while a party in power may consider itself as representing the ultimate power and being the establishment, it has some in its ranks who form the core while others including the top bosses may belong to the other two categories.
Part of the media is a core member but it is also divided between the other two categories. For instance, the ownership of media groups had always been part of the core group of the establishment. The editorial teams, on the other hand, did not follow a single path i.e. not all had links to the establishment. There were always some editorial groups with peripheral members while others remained independent.
However, as a professional group, the media was considered too important to be left out of the system and so was brought into the fold completely in the past decade. Proactive engagement with the media was planned to ensure uniformity in terms of alignment between the editorial teams of the media and the establishment. Along with the media as an institution, key intellectuals, academics and opinion-makers have also become part of the peripheral group.
The system is intelligent: it doesn’t resemble that of the former Soviet regime. People are often confused by the various debates in the media that gives an impression of independence. Views can differ and internal battles within the establishment can also surface through the media but this does not mean a qualitative difference of opinion.
Members of the media can support certain political positions or individuals without necessarily wanting to change the overall system in a way that the establishment becomes less significant. And so certain political actions can become a means to negotiate power within the core group of the establishment rather than signify a major systemic change.
It must also be noted that there are some other state institutions, including the judiciary, that are taken on board on a need-be basis. Historically, the judiciary was brought on board to endorse the legitimacy of the system and so the group has associate membership of the establishment. The militant groups on the whole also belong to the category of associate members which means that these can be abandoned or their significance reduced once they are not needed any more. However, a distinction has to be made between the militant groups and those among their leadership who have become part of the peripheral group just like the religious parties.
Another feature of the socio-political system driven by the establishment is that it is largely informal which means that there are no institutionalised modes of communication. A lot depends on signals. Also, an individual, though he/she may be part of the core group, could lose his/her significance if found to deviate from the interests or ideology of the establishment. The system then kicks in to push out the deviant member.
Even the topmost member of the military has been pushed out once he abandoned the principles. The most recent example is Pervez Musharraf who became irrelevant for the establishment once he deviated from certain key principles and embarked upon policy change. The establishment is not a monolith, but it comes together as soon as its interests are threatened. Understanding this dinosaur is necessary before its power is contested.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
Source: Dawn

A view of Utilitarian Islam

2010-04-08T16:02:00.000-07:00

There are many who make the mistake of differentiating between secular in liberal in Pakistan. People, who tolerate or follow some western habits are deemed liberal, and others as radical. However, Pakistan primarily consists of utilitarian secular-Muslims. These people are those, who may have liberal habits, but can use or assist radical elements and ideology as well. This is a profile and analysis of one of the key businessmen in Pakistan. See how comfortably he mixes different drinks
http://rapidshare.com/files/373629329/Malik_Riaz.pdf.html?killcode=18188193191968400926