Maleeha Lodhi Juggling a Dream

Maleeha Lodhi’s edited volume is one of the few books that Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations’ head Maj. General Athar Abbas recommends to his visitors. The value of this book for Pakistan’s armed forces and establishment is that it presents Pakistan as ‘beyond a crisis state’. The basic thesis of the volume is that there are many things which are not right about the country but that in itself does not qualify it as a failed or failing state. The seventeen contributors have come together in this volume to present the generally unsung successes of Pakistan or to make it look like a normal state, like any other.

            Having gone through the book from cover to cover a reader can get a bit lost. There are some chapters which tend to stand alone as Ahmed Rasheed’s on Afghanistan. Broadly, the seventeen chapters can be divided into five discussion themes: (a) presenting an alternative narrative, (b) history of Pakistan’s birth (c) debate on the changing nature of civil- military relations, (d) opinion by Pakistani expatriates on technical issues such as improving governance, economic development, solving problems of energy generation, and improving quality of youth through education, and (e) military-strategic issues such as nuclear security, military strategy, relations with India, and debate on Afghanistan. The book is a great example of an edited volume since it does not burden a reader with a long introduction and conclusion. Moreover, it neatly brings together three kinds of authors: (a) those who have a big name and hence market value such as Ahmed Rasheed, Ayesha Jalal, Akbar S. Ahmed, Ishrat Husain and Mohsin Hamid, (b) writers with technical expertise or a bent of mind which is sympathetic to the military establishment like Muneer Akram, Riffat Hussain, Brig. (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, Shuja Nawaz snd Meekal Ahmed, and (c) young writers who are meant to bring a fresh perspective, for instance, Moeed Yusuf and Ziad Haider. The book is wanting in terms of a solid debate on youth, women, and relations with the US, India and the Muslim world. The chapter on youth and education by Moeed Yusuf or Riffat Hussain’s contribution on analysing a couple of decades of India-Pakistan peace initiatives does not fulfill the purpose.

Irrespective of how sympathetic one feels with Lodhi’s agenda of improving Pakistan’s image, the task could have been done in a more sophisticated manner than, for instance, by Mohsin Hamid’s suggestion that the country must be taken seriously because it is the 6th largest country in the world and has more non-Muslims living in it than the total population of Toronto and Miami. Even more non-serious is the suggestion that honour killings can be ignored because better things happen as well such as men dressing up as transvestites and doing a television show. All states and societies have inherent contradictions. But one behaviour pattern cannot be deemed as representing the overall attitude of a society. Pakistan’s problem is not that it will physically dissolve. At this juncture, it is physically secure with all external and internal stakeholders interested in keeping the state alive. However, it is also a fact that all players want to dominate and capture the state including the militants.

            So, the narrative in this book does not really explain the direction which the country is taking, nor does it analyse the impact of the growing latent radicalism in Pakistan on the future of its people and the region as a whole. It is even more difficult to sympa- thize with Akbar S. Ahmed’s assertion in the book that the historical confusion regarding the state’s ideology, which dates back to its birth, is nothing more than strategic vagueness that was meant to gel different people and schools of thought together. The confusion created due to the lack of clarity of the country’s earlier and later leadership has pushed the country in a direction where it has become a nest of militancy and latent- radicalism. What is required, as suggested in Ziad Haider’s excellent analysis, is an alternative narrative. However, neither Haider nor any other contributor to this volume has mulled over the issue of an alternative religious, political and social discourse that may take the country out of its current logjam.

            Pakistan’s fundamental problem is that the state defines citizenship on the basis of a citizen’s putative relationship with religion and the central establishment. This leaves out millions of non-Muslims or members of minority ethnic communities from a sense of representation. Those that choose to protest their rights like the East Pakistanis or Baluch are then brutally butchered in the name of national security. This volume chooses to focus on religion related violence. This category of violence cannot be stopped because the problem of the religiosity of the state becomes compounded with another issue of a powerful military bureaucracy, an institution which tends to use all measures including religion and violence to gain its military-strategic objectives. According to Zahid Hussain, some of the militant groups were connected with the military due to the role they played in the possible resolution of the Kashmir issue or in helping GHQ Rawalpindi deal with India.

            Whether it is the urge for strategic depth in Afghanistan or India in general the state’s strategic goals have been critical in changing social ethos and framed the attitude of the middle class. It is not the modern and liberal socioeconomic category that Lodhi imagines it to be. Had the editor gone more than skin-deep in digging into the character of the middle class, she and other contributors to this volume may have found that the bulk of the middle class is, in fact, radicalized or not liberal at all. The fact that people do not generally vote for the religious parties does not indicate the character of the society. Pakistan’s electoral politics responds to patronage politics and not to ideological politics. Maleeha Lodhi clearly shuns the feudal and patronage tendencies of the country’s political system and links it with the traditional elite. However, such analysis lacks depth and fails to present the correct picture that feudalism in Pakistan has actually morphed into different shapes and penetrated various institutions including the military and civil bureaucracy. So, it does not make any difference if, as Shuja Nawaz writes in his chapter on the military, the armed forces have become more diverse in terms of their ethnic composition or are increasingly from urban areas.

            A number of authors in this book use highly superfluous and unscientific methodology to explain different social norms. In fact, there is little analysis on how the military visualizes itself or its role in the country’s power politics. The GHQ does not intend to empower the political leadership. Hence, Saeed Shafqat’s notion that the extension given to the Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani indicates a level of confidence of the political leadership in its own capacity to deal with the military, appear comical. Shafqat’s piece is certainly in a more academic style than many other chapters in this volume as it experiments with the concept of elite negotiation to explain the current coexistence between the political forces and the military. Pakistan’s military bureaucracy is known for making partnerships with civilian stakeholders which eventually make the organization last longer than, perhaps, its counterparts in the Middle East. The story of the coexistence between civil and military narrated by Shafqat does not do justice in explaining the real malaise of Pakistan’s political system.

It would have been a good idea to have a chapter dedicated to understanding Pakistan military’s preoccupation with India. In this regard the chapter by Muneer Akram, who is a senior Pakistani diplomat, on strategic issues is refreshing. It clearly explains that the establishment has moved away from its fear that India wants to destroy Pakistan. It is rare in the works on strategy to come across a clear perspective on the military’s perception on India as in the chapter mentioned here.

            Equally good are the chapters on energy security and bureaucratic restructuring. Though a bit dense Ishrat Hussain’s chapter on administrative restructuring is another good contribution which will help any Pakistani government in improving governance. If asked to summarize the book, it is an expression of the desires of many Pakistanis to emerge as a successful country. Whether this dream will get fulfilled is a million dollar question which sadly doesn’t get answered in this book.

Two Dead...Twenty More to Go

I had met Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti just a couple of months ago at a dinner party hosted by the Brazilian ambassador. He did not wear the airs of a minister or a VIP, was extremely personable and friendly to talk to. When I asked him about what was happening on the blasphemy law, and whether President Asif Zardari was doing anything about it, his answer was that though the president wanted to bring the change, he was surrounded by people in his party who would not let him do it. In fact, almost a year ago, the president had invited a few civil society members and told them to keep reminding him about bringing the much-needed change in the controversial blasphemy law and improving relations with India.

Unfortunately, now it appears as though he won’t be able to fulfil any of those wishes. The death of two senior members of the government, Salman Taseer followed by Bhatti, would push Zardari further into hiding. Perhaps his insistence to the civil society to keep the pressure on him was meant to create a counter-balance to the hyper-conservative elements in his party. He wanted to show them that there was sufficient demand from the liberal civil society in the country to consider a review of the blasphemy law, which was made and implemented under General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule.

One wonders if the president realised then that Pakistan’s liberal civil society is composed of a handful of people, and is getting smaller by the day. Not too long ago, Senator Farid Paracha of the Jamaat-e-Islami had challenged a liberal Pervez Hoodbhoy on television and told him that the religious right knows exactly who this handful of liberals are. And the religious zealots are now taking the liberals down, one by one. So, if you are a liberal, better write your own obituary and keep it close for the moment when your turn comes.

Why can’t civil society fight these militant forces? There are several explanations. First, the liberal sections of society have always remained confused between social, cultural and political liberalism. Therefore, liberal poets like Fahmida Riaz, who remained in self-exile in India under Zia’s regime, consider Pervez Musharraf’s government liberal and representative of middle-class values. But does she even know that the bulk of the middle class is conservative, and many of them aid and abet jihadis and fund madarsas? She probably doesn’t even realise that her middle-class hero Musharraf had actively partnered with the jihadis while holding his glass of whiskey in the other hand.

Second, this socially liberal civil society remains confined to upper and upper-middle classes that cannot fathom the socio-political growth of the rest of Pakistan. One wonders when the liberal elite interacted with real Pakistan. They seem surprised that the heroes of middle-class urban Pakistan are people like Faisal Shahzad, Aafia Siddiqui and Mumtaz Qadri. As for the lower-class Pakistani, he/she cannot afford God, like the poor in other parts of the world. No effort was ever made to liberate the lower classes socially and politically.

Third, a shift in the trajectory of the Muslim elite at the time of Partition. Having made a country in the name of religion, the elite then abandoned the religious discourse to the mullah with whom they had an understanding, so that religion and religious slogans could be borrowed from time to time to gain legitimacy. More then 60 years after, the liberal elite has no control over the religious discourse.

At this juncture, Pakistan represents a fairly slow Iranian model. What must be watched is the bridge-building between the Deobandis, the Ahl-Hadith and the Barelvis. This may translate in the medium- to long-term into creating a hybrid-moderate-theocracy. The word “moderate” implies the presence of some liberal elements that are needed to engage with the rest of the world. But in the longer term, it could push further towards a fully theocratic state.

Lest we forget, the brutal murders of Taseer and Bhatti indicate the coming of age of Zia’s children. The bulk of educated civil society, including the media and lawyers, are tilted towards the ideological right. The judiciary is known to free murderers like the head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other jihadi organisations because the police cannot provide evidence to convict them. In such a situation, all we need to do is begin counting the bodies. It is two gone and twenty more to go.

Are You there Mr President?

Rehman Malik has yet again scattered his pearls of illogic by imposing restriction on artists visiting India who will now have to seek a no-objection-certificate (NoC) from the ministry. Initially, it sounded as if he meant everyone visiting India. It seems so reminiscent of Zia days.

            More important, I wonder what the President has to say in his defense when he had reminded some visiting civil society members a year ago of constantly pestering him to revoke the blasphemy law and improve relations with India. Creating space in the religious discourse and improving relations with regional states is critical for Pakistan’s own growth and development. Since the end of the 1980s, every government seems to have realized this logic. Or was it a different Asif Zardari than this one who seems to have gone in hiding and so allows his interior minister to shoot himself and the entire nation in the foot? Or is it that the President is too scared to implement what he had reminded the civil society members? We know that his party is completely divided on supporting Taseer and may be in a greater fix on improving ties with India.

            Such restrictions on artists is absolutely ridiculous and gives the country an image of a state with an iron curtain just like the former Soviet Union had during the days of the Cold War with the US. A singer, an artist, a writer, poet, sculptor, or anyone who can create has a right to travel around freely. Unless the government employs these people, they are private citizens that sell certain services. It brings good name to the country when they perform abroad.

The government may or may not have any contribution in training these artists or making them famous. In any case, why should the government care about its citizen making a fool of himself or herself while they are abroad when it allows its great names like Mehdi Hassan or others to die in poverty and infamy? Lets be honest, it was only after Rahat Fateh Ali made his way to a bigger market in bollywood that he got noticed in Pakistan and outside.

            Why such show of aimless ego when the government doesn’t really care about hundreds and thousands of Pakistanis that travel or live abroad? Or will Rehman Malik impose a condition on all Pakistanis traveling abroad to seek NoC just because some are caught steeling or engaging in other crimes in other countries? After all, people are people and they may or may not engage in activities that would eventually put them in trouble or embarrass them. But they do not necessarily become the government’s responsibility. In any case, if Mr Malik is so peeved about the state’s honor and wants to regulate the behavior and personal lives of citizens, he may also look into disciplining the numerous militant organizations that create trouble abroad. This might help the state’s image more than anything else.

            The interior ministry does not even have the infrastructure and system to impose such a law. Such restrictions at best will ensure that Pakistani artists don’t get invited abroad.

The interior minister is possibly trying to make the establishment happy. But then, isn’t he supposed to get his queue from Asif Zardari? Or is it that the president himself has changed the way he used to think about peace and stability in the region and changing relations with neighbors?

            I am also reminded of Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s first visit to the UK as a foreign minister. The Pakistani high commissioner gathered a few individuals from think tanks and some journalists for a dinner meeting with the foreign minister. Later in the evening, the foreign minister rose to give his speech. He passionately spoke about his desire to make his first trip to India and improve relations with the next door neighbor. It all sounded good except that the defense, air and naval attache’s sitting on my table did not see eye to eye with Shah Mehmmod Qureshi. Clearly, their brief was different from Qureshi’s. It was not too long before SQM also started following the brief from the GHQ rather than from his party’s leadership. Now, it appears that other ministers have gone the same route. A similar restriction was introduced under Zia’s rule which was fought back and removed through the efforts of Benazir Bhutto. It would help if someone saw the illogic of the above decision. 

The Case of Cholistan's Stolen Land

Anyone passing through lower Cholistan, especially if they happen to be participating in the famous Cholistan jeep rally, will not fail to notice the prominent Lashkare Tayyaba (LeT) and Jamat-ud-Daawa (JuD) wall-chalkings. One of the slogans decries India for being “a water thief.” Water is a sensitive issue for people who don’t have access to it. India’s decision to construct new dams or to control the flow of water is causing major concern in the area. But that is not only the cause of concern in the region.

       Move on towards Sadiqabad and Rahimyar Khan in Bahawalpur and you will hear farmers complain about how the army is stealing their share of water. In the past few years, people of the area have held public demonstration against water theft but to no avail. According to official estimates, 21,000 acres of land in these two districts are affected due to water theft from the Abbasia link canal. Out of the canal’s capacity of 4500 cusecs of water, nearly 350-400 cusecs are being stolen. This canal became operational in 2002 and the army units have made 20 illegal outlets (104-109 RD and 213-228 RD) at Chak Wahni and Qasimwala heads to feed their lands. Officially, the army is only allowed one outlet to feed its troops while they exercise in the area. Irrigation officials claim that even the legal outlet has been expanded illegally to draw more water. Driving along the canal, one can spot huge excavating machines and dumpers meant to dig the land and make outlets. Taking their cue from the army, others have also joined in the fray. The irrigation officials named some local politicians and professionals such as Asmatullah Niazi (district president, PML-Q), Iqbal Moghul (Naib Nazim, Liaquatpur), Iqbal Channar (MPA, PML-N), Professors Rafiq Minhas and Nazeer Khan, relatives of a local PPP politician, Col. (retd.) Naveed, and Brig. (retd.) S. M. Tiwana as some of those who steal water. But irrigation department officials contend that the army steals a larger share and poses a bigger problem. And unless they don’t stop this illegal practice, the civilians will continue to follow in their footsteps. Furthermore, civilian water thieves argue that they won’t stop until the army does the same. This makes it almost impossible for irrigation officials to stop anyone else. In any case, a lot of the civilians involved in stealing are well connected with the army.

       Irrigation officials have tried their level best to put an end to this of water theft, but they lack the resources and the authority to contest the army’s involvement. The staff responsible for stopping such illegal practices comprises a sub-divisional officer (SDO), a mate and four baildars (agricultural labor). And they have no legal authority to arrest the offenders or take any action against them. The police, on the other hand, are reluctant to act because of fear and for administrative reasons. Since the area in question falls between two districts – Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan – it is usually not clear which DPO has jurisdiction to carry out the anti-theft operations. In any case, such administrative excuses are often used to hide the fact that no one wants to take on the army. A couple of years back, when an irrigation department officer tried to close one of the army’s illegal outlets, he was manhandled and kept in custody for 24 hours. Interestingly, the army has also forcibly taken over two irrigation rest houses at Maitla and Qasimwala. The provincial administration and the chief minister Punjab knows of the matter and was updated about the situation during his visit to the area in June/July 2008. Despite all information he just evaded the issue. The officials seemed especially unhappy with one army officer in charge of these operations, Major Manucheher Munawar Awan.

       Filing complaints against such high-handedness is a tough job because these matters do not come under the jurisdiction of Bahawalpur Corps. Oddly enough such issues fall are under the administrative control of the Pannu Aqil Corps, which operates through an office at Bahadur Chowk, Rahimyar Khan. The area was abuzz with complaints about the high handedness of the major representing the Panu Aqil Corps.

       Water theft, however, is part, or an extension of a bigger scam involving the army’s illegal occupation and use of state land. According to official records, the army has illegally occupied 99, 865 acres of Cholistan land and 5,000 acres belonging to the forest department. Moreover, the army has 2,07,992 acres legally leased to it by the provincial government for operational purposes such as for building firing ranges. A large chunk of the legally-leased land was given to the army in 1978. In the larger Bahawalpur division (Cholistan is part of Bahawalpur), the army only has ownership of about 8,700 acres that were sold to it out of which 8500 acres were purchased by the army to build the new cantonment in Bahawalpur city. However, the illegal acquisition of land and its illegal subletting started mainly after 1999. These activities coincided with the tenure of three army officers who were made in charge of the Cholistan Development Authority (CDA) and had the power to allocate land. The first one was a serving major general, S. Zaidi who served for a year to be followed by a retired major general Razzak and later a retired brigadier. Brig. (retd) Tiwana also acquired personal stake in the illegal subletting of the illegally occupied land. The brigadier is now a cultivator of hundreds of acres. The tenure of the three officers spanned nearly a decade 1999-2008.

A lot of the illegally occupied land is used for commercial purposes. According to official records, the army has illegally leased out 17, 063 acres of the illegally occupied land and 3,000 acres of its legally leased land. The subletting activity means leasing the land to big local landowners and businessmen of the area or non-locals who have acquired this land. In a lot of cases, land is leased out in the name of some senior army personnel who then sublet it to others. The illegal water outlets are meant to provide uninterrupted supply of water. It is a very clever scheme because the cultivators don’t have to pay any water rates or agricultural and other taxes levied by the provincial government. The land tends to be more productive then others because it is virgin land and has ample supply of water. The going rate in the area is Rs 35,000 per acre (this rate is common information for the local cultivators). However, there is no standard rate as far as the army is concerned. Depending on their level of acquaintanceship with the army, some lessees may pay a lower rental per acre. In any case, there is no transparency in this business and it is common knowledge that the actual rental income deposited in the Corps Commander’s special fund with the intention of being spend on soldier’s welfare is often less than the going rate. There is little transparency of the special fund which was established during Zia’s reign as an amount of money placed at the Corps Commander’s discretion for secret or special operations, or welfare of soldiers. When a local revenue officers raised questions about the subletting and rentals he was politely told to mind his own business as a lot of ‘big fish’ had stakes in the property.

       So the business continues, no questions asked. The Poor Cholistanis are being deprived of their land and the farmers are being deprived water, creating major resentment among the locals against a state institution and the state itself.

Political Homosexuality

Do political hijras look any different?

Can I suggest that politics is also highly gendered. Just like things fall in the category of masculine and feminine, political ideology also has its types. Considering my own bias for the feminine, I would argue that there are forces, which support the democratic process, and hence can be rated as feminine. Those that favor authoritarian-military rule fall in the category of masculine. In Pakistan's case there is yet another category of political heterosexuals. These are individuals or forces that might pretend to be feminine but are actually the other, or they tend to swing both ways. Therefore, politics has increasingly become the game played by political hijras (eunuchs) or heterosexuals.

To give an example a few weeks ago Farahnaz Isphani's company organized a show at the Pakistan National Council of Arts, Islamabad where the chief guest were the PM, Yusuf Raza Gillani and the now 'extended' army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. For those, who are not familiar with the lady, she is a PPPP parliamentarian and wife of Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, Hussain Haqqani. She was formerly a booker for CNN before getting a job with VoA which she had to leave because of the company's internal politics and her poor management. Anyway, the news is that this event happened exactly after her husband shook hands with the army chief.

This country and its politics seems to be a great example of political heterosexuality - everyone ready to bugger the other and offering their own service to the more powerful. Farahnaz's case is not new. The government's foreign minister falls in the same category. He seems pretty keen to become 'His Master's Voice'. Shah Mehmood Qureshi's recent letter to the UN in which he objected to the fingers raised by the international organization on the military and its intelligence agencies during investigation of Benazir Bhutto's murder is one of the many examples. Why should it surprise anyone at all? Its nothing new that the great sajjada nasheen has done. I remember a dinner party at the US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain's house in Islamabad. She had invited a few people for dinner including JI's Liaquat Baluch, the NRB fame Lt. General (retd) Tanveer Naqvi, Shah Mehmood Qureshi and a few others. I can't forget how pir sahib was singing praises of the devolution of democracy plan carved out by the general and making all efforts to make the general happy. "Oh it is a great program and we are making tremendous progress in strengthening of democracy" was the pir's refrain. He was then commanding the local government in Multan. It didn't matter that his party chief BB, who was then alive, did not agree with the devolution formula. In any case, the pir from Multan has this toothpaste or a traitor smile. The other examples being Zia-ul-Haq and the present head of the state. You don't know what are they hiding inside. But who cares? Shah Mehmood Qureshi wanted to save his little fiefdom in Multan. This puts him in the category of political eunuchs which means that they are not what we think they look like.

The pir sahib's political heterosexuality is, unfortunately, a manufacturing defect. He was born with it. He seems to have taken after his father Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi. While Sajjad Qureshi was the governor of Punjab General Zia, who was both the President and army chief then, happened to visit Lahore data darbar. As the dictator got out of the mausoleum Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi, who was also then the sajjada nasheen of a great shrine in Multan, put Zia's shoes in front of him with his own hands. This is called saving ones backside or knowing which side the bread is buttered, and then really applying lots of it on the toast . But its this over-obsession with saving the backside which turns a lot of politicians towards political heterosexuality. While they pretend to be for the democratic forces, there heart lies elsewhere. Moreover, this is not limited to the PPPP. Look at PML-N where the younger brother has been in bed with the military for a long time assisted by other political heterosexual like one particular chaudhry who actually looks like one in reality as well. Not to forget the PML-Q which is defined by its political heterosexuality. Deep-center, look at the great pir sahib of Pagara sharif who has played second fiddle to the GHQ. Interestingly, the pir sahib was quite powerful during Zia's regime and is held responsible for thwarting the procurement of newer Type-23 British frigates and supported the case for the old Type-21s. The pir sahib is related with pir Yusuf Raza Gillani, Makhdoom Ahmed Mehmood (PML-Q), Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi and other political stalwarts. Marriage was a great tool to connect European courts during the days of monarchical and feudal Europe. Dig a bit deeper and you will find familiar names - people involved in getting the Bhutto government of the 1970s in trouble by leaking secrets of dalai camp to the press, or the legal community working closely with the military. Some would like to say "is hamam mein sab nangey hein" (all in this bath are naked). This is not about nudity but about political sexual preference.

Nothing odd in this behavior except that the elites tend to service their interests first. Shah Mehmood Qureshi or other pirs like him represent a certain vested interest. Given Pakistan's patronage based political system, an individual politician's capability is gauged on his power to extract resources (all kinds) from the state. This formula does not produce democrats but hijras. 64 years after independence the patronage based political system has turned the tide in a way that civil-military relations must be carefully re-evaluated. There is now an abundance of political hijras and military hijras (these are military personnel pretending to be pro-democracy while they just use the concept to further their own political objectives. Most just want to remain in circulation through the media and the conference circuit and not die away like frogs).

Time to rethink the concept of the powerful establishment in Pakistan. Although it is a complex subject on which serious work was not done after the great sociologist Hamza Alavi or American political sociologist Stanley Kochanek (sadly both are now dead), I would like to lay down some basic perimeters of the country's power politics and contours of the establishment. First, as argued by well-respected authors like Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan's polity is really bureaucratic in nature. The state bureaucracy, from the early days, had a game plan for the state according to which politics, politicians and political parties were to be used to seek legitimacy from the public. This is also the reason that the military bureaucracy allows a civilian interlude every ten years. Also, it explains why the politicians tend not to learn from their past mistakes. Power, including electoral power, is always carefully manipulated. Most politicians understand that the electoral process is primed to meet the demands of the establishment except for in a post-crisis election. The formula is that every election after a crisis is likely to be fairer than the one held in relatively normal circumstances. For example, the 1970, 1988 and 2008 elections were comparatively fairer. In the absence of a crisis it is easier to distract the un-motivated voter to sift through the results.

Second, as Hamza Alavi argued, the state bureaucracy (civil and military) was meant to service the interests of the elite. I would argue that the over-concentration of power resulted in turning the civil and military bureaucracy into powerful stakeholders (for those interested in data-based analysis plz see Stanley Kochanek's book on Pakistan's Politics and Interest Groups). Third, at this juncture the establishment or the power elite is closely connected with each other through personal ties and shared interests and values. Just look at different powerful families. One example that quickly comes to mind is that of the Abida Hussain clan which has stakes in the political system, the media (through Najam Sethi/Jugnoo Mohsin group), business and industry (Syed Babur Ali), the military and the civil bureaucracy. Another angle - you will find members from the same family in different political parties as well as the state bureaucracy, the media, judiciary and other powerful groups. So, they tend to fight each other and use the conflict to gain legitimacy. This explains why the political leadership never managed to get rid of the army nor the army could ever succeed to bring about alternative leadership.

Therefore, I'd like to argue that the powerful establishment always comprises of a primary group which is aided by a secondary group of beneficiaries. Its the prime actors who form the core of the establishment. Since the birth of the country, there has been a lot of juggling between the primary and secondary players until the group began to consolidate its shape in the past couple of decades or more. A glance at the following table will give some idea about the partnership:

1947-54: (primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
               (secondary) TMs+PMIs+LC+Media

1954-71: (Primary) Mil+CB+LF+TIs+B&I
               (Secondary) LC+PMIs+Media


1971-77: (Primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
               (Secondary) Mil+B&I+LC+Media+PMIs

1977-88: (Primary) Mil+CB+PMIs
               (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+Media

1988-99: (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs
               (Secondary) LF+TIs+Media+LC

1999-01 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs+Media
              (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+NGOSec+ForExp

2001-08 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+PMIs
              (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC

2008-todate (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+LC
                    (Secondary) LF+TIs+NGOSec+ForExp

LF = landed-feudal
Mil = Military
TMs = Trader-Merchant class
B&I = Business and Industry
CB = civil bureaucracy
LC = legal community (a glance at Kochanek's work will show that the legal community was always part of the power elite. They were included in the initial legislatures and played a more formal role in the form of the judiciary)
TIs = Traditional Islamiscts (pirs and sajjada nasheens)
PMIs = Post-modernist Islamiscts (religious right and religious warriors)
NGOSec = non-governmental sector
ForExp = Elite foreign expatriates that are increasingly becoming partners of the state bureaucracy and frequently channel money into military sponsored projects abroad. These connections are useful especially in terms of financing positions and endowments abroad that will service the interest of the bureaucracy.


A careful look at this power arrangement and you will notice how state bureaucracy has always been a member of the core/primary. This includes the Bhutto years when the military was resuscitating and the civil bureaucracy became tremendously powerful due to its expanded role in business and industrial management. Also, the media was always on board. The first paper Dawn had state-sponsership and its editorial was always close to the state including after the change from the right to left of center. Its just that the center (after 1971) was aligned with the left as well, or at least seemingly so. Then there was Pakistan Times, the Nawa-i-Waqt group, Massawat, etc. After its physical expansion the media has begun to play a more important role. While the ownership was always aligned with the establishment, especially state bureaucratic forces, in recent years the editorial has largely managed to align itself as well. No wonder, the pay commission issue is never resolved.

The problem with the above alignment is that the elite become myopic and predatory and begin to inadvertently destroy the state. They have managed to damage the nation-state and all we are now left with is the administrative-state. This structure results in generating a clogged-up political system reeking of stench because political power does not move around and is concentrated in a small space. Much to the dislike of my alleged leftist friends, the current fad of militancy is actually a result of the above-described political heterosexuality and muck. Violence is natural in a socio-polity where all legitimate means to re-negotiate power are dead or tightly-controlled. This is not to suggest that the Deobandi-Salafi-Wahabi jihadis are the future. They, of course, have a central place in the core group of the establishment and may partly replace the elite in different parts of the state, if not the entire country. But more important, they will prosper considering that the existing elite have mostly seemed to turn into bloody hijras. I would like to apologize from the actual physical hijras because they may have more balls in them than their political counterparts.

Ps: If you think the above table needs modification, plz suggest and lets have a good discussion. An analysis of the sociology of power politics is crucial for understanding the country's political future.

Ludwig von Rochau's Children

Ludwig von Rochau was a German gent, a 19th century writer and politicians responsible for formulating the theory of realpolitik. The idea is about the state using Machiavellian tactics to expand its power. The theory is extremely state centric. I suspect the German really must have come and settled in South Asia because we have ample supply of people who subscribe to this theory. I suppose as the Punjabis would put it our realpolitik buffs must share their nani (maternal grandmother) with the German especially Rochau.

This preamble was meant to express my surprise at the fact that so many of the educated people, especially from media and academia, seem so enamored by realpolitik. Very recently had a chance to look at journalist Aamir Ahmed Khan's article in Express Tribune titled: 'India is not to blame" (http://tribune.com.pk/story/22465/india-is-not-the-problem/). The main thesis of the author was that the present Pakistani civilian government is hopeless and has voluntarily given up the option to run its foreign and security policy, and that the Taliban were being created by Indian RAW. I immediately sat down to jog my memory about the last time GHQ ever allowed any political government to run either the security or foreign policies. Or is it that Aamir Ahmed Khan, who runs BBC Urdu, has joined the bandwagon of those who believe things will improve dramatically only if Asif Ali Zardari and his personal clowns would leave. What goes without saying that he probably considers these other clowns as trustworthy. Not surprised. In fact, I was reminded of a conversation I had with the author way back in 2007 just a couple of days before my book military inc was launched in Islamabad. I had gone to invite him for the event and he had kindly offered to take copies of the book to Generals Pervez Musharraf and Ehsan. At that time, Mr Khan was quite close to General Ehsan and remains so.


More recently, another good journalist known for his mastery over a European language was in the American capital. He was found telling friends about how Pakistan army was ready to and engaged in cleaning the country up of all these unsavory Taliban and militants. The proof? His meetings with General Asfaq pervez Kiyani which normally run into a few hours. The gent was of the opinion that the shortest meeting was three-and-a-half hours and only when he requested the good general to wrap up. Does it surprise anyone why the army doesn't do so well in battles? If its general spends hours explaining or educating a journalist then where does he find the time for his own men and operations!


But then there has been a transformation of the military over so many years. This is no longer a professional force particularly from the objective of fulfilling the task of protecting the state from external threat or drawing out and implementing successful military operations. However, it has done better in saving its own image and managing things politically. Its senior officers are successful public relations guys who know the art of developing rapport with journalists or using the media to their own advantage. Just look at the present army chief who appears to use his own charms, besides deploying the ISPR, ISI and SPD combine, to turn the tide in his favor. The long meetings with our journalist friend are not driven by some altruistic designs. The good general wants to convince the world that he is on top of things when it comes to fighting militancy. Such an image helps convince policymakers abroad of the dire need to retain General Kiyani as Pakistan army's service chief.


This is not to suggest that it all revolves around the issue of the general's extension. However, it feeds into that plot as well. There are three options that are being discussed. First, the general gets an extension. The problem is that he may get it because the American are interested in such an eventuality (apparently, Mike Mullen does not even hear anything against Kiyani in private meetings), but that it may give an impression of Kiyani being an over-ambitious general. Second, he gets elevated to the position of an up-graded position of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It may not be too favorable an option in the GHQ. Third, extension in the term of the army chief from 3 to 5 years. There are strong rumors with journalists like Najam Sethi supporting such possibility. The good general is indeed extremely smart and intelligent. If Machiavelli were to chose an heir it might be our good commander. After all, this army is trained to produce those that pursue the principle of realpolitik.

A Facebook Party

This looks like a season for setting up alternative political parties in and for Pakistan. While some are struggling inside the country to revamp the existing structures or create new ones, others are trying to setup new parties outside.

In Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F got members of the alliance of religious parties together to revamp it in preparation for the next elections. Similarly, some people have proposed setting up a party of eunuchs in the country. They intend to field candidates in every constituency with the brief message that “we will not make any promises that we cannot fulfill. Others cannot fulfill promises either but we admit that we cannot. All we say is field honest candidates. If you cannot find any then vote for us”. A very clear and crisp message! Even more commendable is the fact that these people made an effort to pose as an alternative despite the socio-cultural bias of the society towards eunuchs. Inherent prejudice was a reason that actress Musarrat Shaheen, who was brave enough to contest elections against Maulana Fazlur Rehman, could not win from Dera Ismail Khan.
However, it is truly appreciable that the eunuchs thought of finding an alternative internally when former dictators like Pervez Musharraf are busy scouting out people in the UK and the US who could bank-roll his political movement in Pakistan. Recently, I had a chance to go to one of the events organized from the forum of ‘Pakistan First’ established and managed by the former head of the Pakistan Cricket Board, Naseem Ashraf. Although the media was asked to come to the event, it was just for a post-meeting briefing by the former dictator. The main event was a private meeting in which he hoped to rope in some of the rich professional expatriate Pakistanis with a desire to make a dent in the politics of the country of their birth. The idea behind calling the press was to show-off that the former general had sufficient support amongst the Pakistani community.
But not everyone invited to the party was a confirmed supporter. Many were there to hear what he had to offer. There were others like an entrepreneur from Philadelphia and another one from Washington state who seemed keen to invest their money in the general. They looked impressed with Musharraf’s facebook following which the former dictator touted happily just like he used to cite the figures of mobile phones and motor-cycle purchase in the Pakistan he ruled as a sign of economic progress. Little did he know that spurious consumption goes up also in non-performing economies.
Sadly, numerous rich and influential Pakistani expats believe they can parachute into the country’s politics or bankroll potential politicians and thus gain a political foothold. Although the old dictator claimed he would hold elections in the party, he claimed he would initially nominate office-bearers. Most important, he did not offer any idea or agenda to attract people to the party. Every question was answered with a ‘we will tell when the time comes’ kind of a slogan.
It looked like a political reconnoitering mission in the US. Reportedly, Musharraf did a better job of speaking then his handlers in the US like Naseem Ashraf. Not to mention the fact that Ashraf was one of the better lot. There were others who seemed to be representing the MQM. While talking to those present, these rather dubious gentlemen claimed that they lived in the US only on Musharraf’s orders. They had returned to Pakistan but returned on the former dictator’s insistence. When asked by people if he did nothing but move around on Musharraf’s beck and call, the gent insisted that he had a life and was happily married. The same gent also claimed Musharraf’s innocence in signing the NRO saying that nothing moved in Pakistan without orders from Washington.
This particular gentleman, who was part of a gang of three, represented a dubious organization called Pak-American Communication which cannot be found on the web. Someone claimed that the people might have represented the MQM. In that case, the only possibility is that there is some wedge within the MQM that Musharraf plans to benefit from. There are educated people within the ethnic party not happy being pide-pippered by Altaf Hussain.
Thus far, the former dictator does not even have a name for his political party. Perhaps, ‘The Facebook’ Party or ‘Made in the US’ might be an appropriate name.

Published in the Express Tribune, May 23rd, 2010.