Keep Talking and Keep Listening!

They say listening is more difficult than talking. But what is even harder in today's world is to communicate - an intense process of listening and talking and listening and responding........
This is a forum for people to engage in a conversation which is an art that many people don't know. Lets listen to others while maintaining the courage of conviction.

Friday, July 23, 2010

Political Homosexuality

Do political hijras look any different?

Can I suggest that politics is also highly gendered. Just like things fall in the category of masculine and feminine, political ideology also has its types. Considering my own bias for the feminine, I would argue that there are forces, which support the democratic process, and hence can be rated as feminine. Those that favor authoritarian-military rule fall in the category of masculine. In Pakistan's case there is yet another category of political heterosexuals. These are individuals or forces that might pretend to be feminine but are actually the other, or they tend to swing both ways. Therefore, politics has increasingly become the game played by political hijras (eunuchs) or heterosexuals.

To give an example a few weeks ago Farahnaz Isphani's company organized a show at the Pakistan National Council of Arts, Islamabad where the chief guest were the PM, Yusuf Raza Gillani and the now 'extended' army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. For those, who are not familiar with the lady, she is a PPPP parliamentarian and wife of Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, Hussain Haqqani. She was formerly a booker for CNN before getting a job with VoA which she had to leave because of the company's internal politics and her poor management. Anyway, the news is that this event happened exactly after her husband shook hands with the army chief.

This country and its politics seems to be a great example of political heterosexuality - everyone ready to bugger the other and offering their own service to the more powerful. Farahnaz's case is not new. The government's foreign minister falls in the same category. He seems pretty keen to become 'His Master's Voice'. Shah Mehmood Qureshi's recent letter to the UN in which he objected to the fingers raised by the international organization on the military and its intelligence agencies during investigation of Benazir Bhutto's murder is one of the many examples. Why should it surprise anyone at all? Its nothing new that the great sajjada nasheen has done. I remember a dinner party at the US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain's house in Islamabad. She had invited a few people for dinner including JI's Liaquat Baluch, the NRB fame Lt. General (retd) Tanveer Naqvi, Shah Mehmood Qureshi and a few others. I can't forget how pir sahib was singing praises of the devolution of democracy plan carved out by the general and making all efforts to make the general happy. "Oh it is a great program and we are making tremendous progress in strengthening of democracy" was the pir's refrain. He was then commanding the local government in Multan. It didn't matter that his party chief BB, who was then alive, did not agree with the devolution formula. In any case, the pir from Multan has this toothpaste or a traitor smile. The other examples being Zia-ul-Haq and the present head of the state. You don't know what are they hiding inside. But who cares? Shah Mehmood Qureshi wanted to save his little fiefdom in Multan. This puts him in the category of political eunuchs which means that they are not what we think they look like.

The pir sahib's political heterosexuality is, unfortunately, a manufacturing defect. He was born with it. He seems to have taken after his father Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi. While Sajjad Qureshi was the governor of Punjab General Zia, who was both the President and army chief then, happened to visit Lahore data darbar. As the dictator got out of the mausoleum Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi, who was also then the sajjada nasheen of a great shrine in Multan, put Zia's shoes in front of him with his own hands. This is called saving ones backside or knowing which side the bread is buttered, and then really applying lots of it on the toast . But its this over-obsession with saving the backside which turns a lot of politicians towards political heterosexuality. While they pretend to be for the democratic forces, there heart lies elsewhere. Moreover, this is not limited to the PPPP. Look at PML-N where the younger brother has been in bed with the military for a long time assisted by other political heterosexual like one particular chaudhry who actually looks like one in reality as well. Not to forget the PML-Q which is defined by its political heterosexuality. Deep-center, look at the great pir sahib of Pagara sharif who has played second fiddle to the GHQ. Interestingly, the pir sahib was quite powerful during Zia's regime and is held responsible for thwarting the procurement of newer Type-23 British frigates and supported the case for the old Type-21s. The pir sahib is related with pir Yusuf Raza Gillani, Makhdoom Ahmed Mehmood (PML-Q), Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi and other political stalwarts. Marriage was a great tool to connect European courts during the days of monarchical and feudal Europe. Dig a bit deeper and you will find familiar names - people involved in getting the Bhutto government of the 1970s in trouble by leaking secrets of dalai camp to the press, or the legal community working closely with the military. Some would like to say "is hamam mein sab nangey hein" (all in this bath are naked). This is not about nudity but about political sexual preference.

Nothing odd in this behavior except that the elites tend to service their interests first. Shah Mehmood Qureshi or other pirs like him represent a certain vested interest. Given Pakistan's patronage based political system, an individual politician's capability is gauged on his power to extract resources (all kinds) from the state. This formula does not produce democrats but hijras. 64 years after independence the patronage based political system has turned the tide in a way that civil-military relations must be carefully re-evaluated. There is now an abundance of political hijras and military hijras (these are military personnel pretending to be pro-democracy while they just use the concept to further their own political objectives. Most just want to remain in circulation through the media and the conference circuit and not die away like frogs).

Time to rethink the concept of the powerful establishment in Pakistan. Although it is a complex subject on which serious work was not done after the great sociologist Hamza Alavi or American political sociologist Stanley Kochanek (sadly both are now dead), I would like to lay down some basic perimeters of the country's power politics and contours of the establishment. First, as argued by well-respected authors like Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan's polity is really bureaucratic in nature. The state bureaucracy, from the early days, had a game plan for the state according to which politics, politicians and political parties were to be used to seek legitimacy from the public. This is also the reason that the military bureaucracy allows a civilian interlude every ten years. Also, it explains why the politicians tend not to learn from their past mistakes. Power, including electoral power, is always carefully manipulated. Most politicians understand that the electoral process is primed to meet the demands of the establishment except for in a post-crisis election. The formula is that every election after a crisis is likely to be fairer than the one held in relatively normal circumstances. For example, the 1970, 1988 and 2008 elections were comparatively fairer. In the absence of a crisis it is easier to distract the un-motivated voter to sift through the results.

Second, as Hamza Alavi argued, the state bureaucracy (civil and military) was meant to service the interests of the elite. I would argue that the over-concentration of power resulted in turning the civil and military bureaucracy into powerful stakeholders (for those interested in data-based analysis plz see Stanley Kochanek's book on Pakistan's Politics and Interest Groups). Third, at this juncture the establishment or the power elite is closely connected with each other through personal ties and shared interests and values. Just look at different powerful families. One example that quickly comes to mind is that of the Abida Hussain clan which has stakes in the political system, the media (through Najam Sethi/Jugnoo Mohsin group), business and industry (Syed Babur Ali), the military and the civil bureaucracy. Another angle - you will find members from the same family in different political parties as well as the state bureaucracy, the media, judiciary and other powerful groups. So, they tend to fight each other and use the conflict to gain legitimacy. This explains why the political leadership never managed to get rid of the army nor the army could ever succeed to bring about alternative leadership.

Therefore, I'd like to argue that the powerful establishment always comprises of a primary group which is aided by a secondary group of beneficiaries. Its the prime actors who form the core of the establishment. Since the birth of the country, there has been a lot of juggling between the primary and secondary players until the group began to consolidate its shape in the past couple of decades or more. A glance at the following table will give some idea about the partnership:

1947-54: (primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
               (secondary) TMs+PMIs+LC+Media

1954-71: (Primary) Mil+CB+LF+TIs+B&I
               (Secondary) LC+PMIs+Media

1971-77: (Primary) LF+TIs+CB+Mil
               (Secondary) Mil+B&I+LC+Media+PMIs

1977-88: (Primary) Mil+CB+PMIs
               (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+Media

1988-99: (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs
               (Secondary) LF+TIs+Media+LC

1999-01 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+PMIs+Media
              (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC+NGOSec+ForExp

2001-08 (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+PMIs
              (Secondary) LF+TIs+LC

2008-todate (Primary) Mil+B&I+CB+Media+LC
                    (Secondary) LF+TIs+NGOSec+ForExp

LF = landed-feudal
Mil = Military
TMs = Trader-Merchant class
B&I = Business and Industry
CB = civil bureaucracy
LC = legal community (a glance at Kochanek's work will show that the legal community was always part of the power elite. They were included in the initial legislatures and played a more formal role in the form of the judiciary)
TIs = Traditional Islamiscts (pirs and sajjada nasheens)
PMIs = Post-modernist Islamiscts (religious right and religious warriors)
NGOSec = non-governmental sector
ForExp = Elite foreign expatriates that are increasingly becoming partners of the state bureaucracy and frequently channel money into military sponsored projects abroad. These connections are useful especially in terms of financing positions and endowments abroad that will service the interest of the bureaucracy.

A careful look at this power arrangement and you will notice how state bureaucracy has always been a member of the core/primary. This includes the Bhutto years when the military was resuscitating and the civil bureaucracy became tremendously powerful due to its expanded role in business and industrial management. Also, the media was always on board. The first paper Dawn had state-sponsership and its editorial was always close to the state including after the change from the right to left of center. Its just that the center (after 1971) was aligned with the left as well, or at least seemingly so. Then there was Pakistan Times, the Nawa-i-Waqt group, Massawat, etc. After its physical expansion the media has begun to play a more important role. While the ownership was always aligned with the establishment, especially state bureaucratic forces, in recent years the editorial has largely managed to align itself as well. No wonder, the pay commission issue is never resolved.

The problem with the above alignment is that the elite become myopic and predatory and begin to inadvertently destroy the state. They have managed to damage the nation-state and all we are now left with is the administrative-state. This structure results in generating a clogged-up political system reeking of stench because political power does not move around and is concentrated in a small space. Much to the dislike of my alleged leftist friends, the current fad of militancy is actually a result of the above-described political heterosexuality and muck. Violence is natural in a socio-polity where all legitimate means to re-negotiate power are dead or tightly-controlled. This is not to suggest that the Deobandi-Salafi-Wahabi jihadis are the future. They, of course, have a central place in the core group of the establishment and may partly replace the elite in different parts of the state, if not the entire country. But more important, they will prosper considering that the existing elite have mostly seemed to turn into bloody hijras. I would like to apologize from the actual physical hijras because they may have more balls in them than their political counterparts.

Ps: If you think the above table needs modification, plz suggest and lets have a good discussion. An analysis of the sociology of power politics is crucial for understanding the country's political future.


  1. Interesting read. You might like to read "Elite Politics in an Ideological State" by Asaf Hussain as well. Nothing really ground-breaking per se, however he might have added something that others would have missed.

  2. @Shahid: thanks for the suggestion. I will have a look. Any idea about when was it published and where?

  3. Citation:-
    Hussain, Asif. Elite Politics in an Ideological State : The Case of Pakistan. Folkestone, England :Wm Dawson & Sons, 1979.

    I happen to have it in Print as of now (thanks to the university library).

    Search it up in your area thanks to library catalogs:-

  4. hi dear aysha thanks for bringing some facts about pakistani politics etc. I used to think same but now realised that although pakistan is independent but in reality is governed by foreign agencies.I have worked with pakistani political and religous parties. I know few families father is in ppp one sone in ji second son in other and third in other. I also blame to the founders of pakistan for this mess which pakistan is now facing.They have recieved titles from british government for their services and failed to put pakistan right path.
    my thanks to SocialMedia_Art who provided link for your blog. Keep up good work

  5. Interesting read.... I usually trace back to your article "Mapping the Establishment" when analysing political players role. Now you have added another angle or I will say extended that one.

  6. Comments on the article from LUBP (

    Abdul Nishapuri says:
    July 25, 2010 at 3:43 am

    There is a picture in the above post on Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s blog with the following caption: Do political hijras look any different?

    Quite an interesting angle.

    On a (relatively) unrelated note, wonder if Ayesha’s article in some way suggests a ridicule of hijras?

    Also, are hijras (eunuchs) equivalent to heterosexuals?

    Just a thought about the metaphors used in an otherwise well written article.

    Pejamistri says:
    July 25, 2010 at 4:00 am

    I always take Ayesha Siddiqa’s writings with pinch of salt , it is very hard for me to digest the fact that someone has such deep knowledge of internal workings of mafia and is not associated with that mafia.
    However I must admit that I agree with most (or all?) of what she writes.
    I am wondering if she has any insight into the letter written by Shah Mahmood Querishi to the United Nations. It is quite obvious particularly in the context of the “extension” of the “Don” , that the letter has a lot of significance , I am wondering what objectives army wanted to achieve through this letter. Is it possible that Army had bargained with Hillary to get the United Nations report “fixed”?

    Any ideas Ayesha/Abdul?

  7. I think you're mixing your metaphors here a bit. Hijra is closer in meaning to hermaphrodite/Transgendered person (or even eunuch). Eunuch connotes "impotence", in pakistani culture at least, (due to lack of you know what) and that pretty much applies to a large swathe of our kleptocratic ruling classes.

    Also, do you mean 'homo-sexuality' when you say 'heterosexuality' ? ("everyone ready to bugger everyone else")

    Peronally, I don't have a problem calling our vulture like kleptocratic ruling "elite" just "a bunch of homos". (with due apologies to homos, hijras, queens and other ambiguously sexed and gendered groups)

  8. See my thoughts on the Pakistani "Establishment" here.



    TL:DR? We don't have an 'establishment'! We have a kleptocratic exploitative ruling class that acts as lackey's to the strategic whims of "benefactor" nations (first UK, then the US.). They are 'mazaraas' of the absentee landlords (The West/The Saudis/The Americans), and being the shameless feudals that they are, they understand this "top/bottom" relation very well (and there is your gay homosexual innuendo right there!)

  9. I don't need to point this out to you, but for other readers:

    See Also:
    "Deep State"

  10. I don’t disagree with your classifications but I would say development of ruling elite is not something unique that has happened to Pakistan only. In pretty much every country around the globe ruling classes make alliances and accommodate emerging interest groups. In the US, you often hear about the Military-industrial complex and their allies in the big media houses. There are about four hundred families in the US that control the wealth and have enormous influence over the policy decisions making. In India too interest groups or the elite make major contribution in the political and policy discourse. The difference for Pakistan: The absence of civilian politicians that have the confidence of the ruling elite to serve them adequately. That makes the elite rely on the direct rule of the civil and military bureaucracy. In some ways we can claim that the power elite (A concept developed by Charles Wright Mills in his 1956 book, The Power Elite) as you put them never had patience with civilian politicians and did not allow them to grow. The primary reason was and still is that the minute politicians approach the people for vote or support, they end up appearing as the opponents of the ruling elite and the ruling elite begins to distrust them. So in other words, the elite in Pakistan are as politically immature as the civilian political class.

    You seem to have omitted the influence of donor countries or country over the Pakistan ruling elite. This factor, since 1951 played a major role in giving confidence to the army to interfere in daily affairs of the Pakistan state.

    I would reduce your first period to 1947-1951. After the military weeded out the independent thinkers from its ranks through the Pindi conspiracy case, it became more confident and that resulted in its formal entry in the Pakistan ruling classes. Even before 1951 the landed gentry had a very limited role and that too was confined to Punjab. In Sindh, NWFP, and Baluchistan the LF groups were actually summarily discarded and sent in to political wilderness. The dismissal of the Khan ministry in NWFP and Khoro Ministry in Sindh and the attack on Khan of Qalat, pretty much took the LF of these three provinces out of the equation and strengthened the civilian bureaucracy that was mostly controlled by former ICS officers like Ghulam Mohammed and Ch. Mohammed Ali. The struggle between the UP politicians and the bureaucracy led to UP politicians formally adopting the post modernist Islamist (PMIs) by passing the Objective Resolution soon after Jinnah’s death.

    The Army in 1953 was powerful enough to dictate its terms and I have documents that prove, and let me paraphrase that Ayub Khan was promising the Americans that he will send the politicians packing if he found them to be working against the National interests as defined by the army.

    1951 -1971 Pretty much I agree with that but the US influence over the policy matters places the US in the primary group.

    1977- Present: was all about the army some groups were co-opted for some periods but their influence was minimal and they hardly were a factor in making policies.

    A word about 1971-77: by this time the LFs and TIs were not influential groups. That was the only period when the mil shared powered with the civilians at times at 50:50 ratios, primarily because the 1971 loss gave more confidence to Bhutto and made the army somewhat unsure of its influence. That did not last long for sure. Bhutto attacked the Traders and Industrials’ (his primary political opponents) by way of Nationalization and sent them back in the army’s camp.

  11. My conclusion is that Bhutto’s destruction of the emerging business class in Pakistan started his downfall and also destroyed a group that would have eventually helped establish democracy and civilian rule in Pakistan.

    Another economic factor that played a part was a major brain drain plus the leasing of the handyman class for green pastures in the West and Middle East. These were the emerging middle class of the country and once they left the country, the ruling elite had to rely more and more on the obstructionist like the PMIs to consolidate their rule. The brain drain started in Bhutto era though Bhutto cannot be blamed for that entirely.

    A word about your classification of the politicians as Khassi (Hijra is a politically incorrect word, imo).

    The politicians the world over are the same and look exactly alike for the simple reason that their job is to serve the ruling elite or the economic interests of different classes in any given country. They are not a separate class. Look around you India, US, UK, France and anywhere else you can think of, they appear to be doing the same thing.

    Politicians gain power by presenting themselves as the true representatives of the different sets of the ruling classes and they do it by gaining public votes using the various ruling or the aspiring to rule group’s money.

    Hamza Ali and the various other authors that you mentioned, do lots of generalization. So I agree with you here that the Civil and primarily the Military bureaucracy in Pakistan do not serve any elite. They are the elite and they serve their own institutional interests. So the argument that the Mil and CB are serving some other groups is completely ridiculous when it comes to Pakistan. Most of the politicians in Pakistan have understood that better than many Pakistani intellectuals. They know that the only way to get close to the power is by serving the Army’s interests. They get money from the army to contest elections and their gaining power ( well, is it really power?) depend on what some Generals or the Mil bureaucrats in the army think of them. As you mentioned most of the elections in Pakistan are not fair.


  12. The real problem in Pakistan is that ruling elite, primarily the army have very limited world view. They have certain sets of rules and they work within those rules. That means the chances of their making changes and adjusting to the ground realities are restricted within their myopic view of the situations.

    " While historically new military rulers have drawn upon available expert opinion in determining national priorities and specific techniques for goal attainment, their choice of advisers, the questions they ask and their interpretation of advice is all too often fashioned by a rather limited world view that is more a product of personal experience, military education and military socialization than an understanding of development processes.
    The military man's perception of the nature of development is likely to be a limited one, and military determination of development effort is likely to limit the scope and nature of both the effort and the gains that accrue from it. We may therefore expect the military approach to development to be pragmatic and programmatic rather than ideological or innovative...the social aspects are likely to be subordinated to economic questions..."

    Fidel, Kenneth. Editor. 1975. Militarism in Developing Countries. Pages 24-25. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

    But please don’t assume that their pragmatism is real.

    “Pragmatism in the case of the Third World country entails that it sacrifice long term sustainable development with short term gains that maintain its subservient position in the global pecking order i.e. the World System.”

  13. I have a few questions here from Ayesha.
    1. What will be the effects of this extension? I feel that all inquiries pending from Musharraf's time will now pend for another three years the least.
    2. I saw your programme on TV and you were logical. All said, I feel that this issue shows the military playing USA's role. Will the public be more critical of this and shift guns from politicians?

  14. I personally don't find outsiders responsible for everything that happens in Pakistan. However, on this occasion the general did ask the US to intervene because those are the key interlocutors between him and the political government. The politicians, unfortunately, will not manage to divert attention towards the army or its high command because they have extended the general's term probably to buy some time from him and his institution. Kindly see my latest article on the subject:

    The real fear, however, lies elsewhere. It is what happens in the army that worries me. Kindly see my next blog in a day for more.

  15. Ayesha! It's really great to see your blog... whatever you can't say in your columns can be freely said here. Wish you all the best.

  16. Ayesha, I'm also wondering about "things to come" in the Military after this move. My own personal sense is that this will help to crystallize any residual rebellion within the junior ranks and allow a 'sting operation' as it were.

    The way the likes of JI and PTI and the other right wingers and pro talib entities are going on an wailing about it, seems like this extension has put a dent in some kind of a plan, and it will only serve to make them desperate.

    Looking forward to your next piece!

  17. It seems to me quite likely that keeping Kayani is not as good for the US as US officials think it is.

    After all, Kayani's promotion leaves a lot of disappointed other generals. Some of them are probably Kayani's enemies. Others will become Kayani's enemies after this. Even the generals who aren't Kayani's enemies, will have to wonder if Kayani thinks they are his enemies. So the high command may be spending a lot of time maneuvering to backstab him, and vice versa. This will not be helpful in the war agaiinst the Taliban.

    The second issue is that it seems pretty likely that Kayani will be widely seen in Pakistan as the candidate of the Americans. My understanding is that the US is very unpopular in Pakistan. So he'll have to visibly oppose the Americans to counteract this impression. The US may not find this helpful.

    Of course, the problem of highly political generals is not confined to Pakistan. I'm inclined to wonder about General Petraeus myself.

    Anyway,this was an interesting, if to me rather confusing, piece. Looking forward t yur next offering.


  18. “I feel that this issue shows the military playing USA's role.”

    Sharaf, it is nice to see you here.

    There is no doubt the military is doing that. I agree with Ayesha only partially. Outsiders are responsible for many things in Pakistan. Actually, I think and I guess we have discussed it before that the Army is doing the Pentagon’s bidding so the army might have some conflicts with the WH on many issues. Let me extend it further by saying that both the WH and the Pentagon clearly have policy differences over the Afghan war and the Pak army is trying to work both sides but with a definite tilt towards the Pentagon. Have you ever noticed that every time someone from the State dept visit Pakistan, the visit is immediately followed by a visit from a Pentagon rep. be it Gen. Petraeus or Mullen who just visited Pakistan after the Hillary visit.

    With the new leaks, it appears that things are coming to a head in Washington and with some knowledge of how the turf battles are resolved in Washington, in a situation like this; both the Pentagon and the WH would be looking for a scapegoat pretty soon. I don’t know who wins the turf battle in Washington, but whosoever does; will come down real hard on a group that is headquartered in Pindi.

    The army in Pakistan is betting on the Pentagon, but I am not sure the Pentagon can manipulate the Afghan situation any more than what it has done already.

  19. you got a death wish or what? brilliant piece, and very funny but its not going to win u many friends. Would love to see Pir sahibs face if he reads this (can he read?)and i sure u won't be advising the FO or GHQ, not to mention Aiwan-e-sadr or for that matter the Pak embassy in washington for a long long time.

  20. Sushant Sareen,

    I've assumed that Ayesha is very well connected in the Pakistan Army and establishment. After all, she's lasted this long, and shortly after Military Inc. (great book, by the way)was published I wouldn't have bet on that.

    Incidentally, it is not at all clear that either the FO or GHQ are going to forgive her for the publication of Military Inc, so maybe Ayesha figures she doesn't have that much to lose.

    Also,it's always possible that she just sees this as her duty. Pakistan, under the influence of extremely shortsighted people in Washington, is arguably tilting back toward military dictatorship. Maybe she feels obligated to use her newspaper column to oppose this.

    So yes, Sushant, I share your concern that Ayesha may be going to far. But she has to judge this, not me. And it's not clear to me that if I were a Pakistani, the situation in Pakistan wouldn't push me over the edge.

    Oddly, I think the US would be better off if the Washington Post carried Ayesha's column, or for that matter yours. But as best I can tell, that is not going to happen.


  21. Slight mis-reading of Hamza Alavi's argument on how the bureaucracy and the military were meant to service the elite. Alavi argues that the nexus was an elite-nexus itself and it was responsible for a) manipulating the traditional classes (the landed elite), b) creating classes (the new industrial bourgeoise), and c) engage with the metropole (the UK and then the US).

    Secondly, bureaucrats became powerful, while the bureaucracy as an institution lost power under Bhutto. There's a subtle but important difference between the two because it shows that the power configuration in the post-bhutto years saw a significant reduction in the influence of the civil servants. The 1973 CTP reforms are a major watershed in this regard.

  22. I wonder if all of this is as complicated as it seems after reading Ms.Siddiqa or is it just a case of the parliamentarians (mainly the feudal elite barring the MQM), part of the religious groups and the Military Industrial Complex, all three factions simply getting together to rule the unfortunate millions. Of course aided and abetted and supported by various foreign countries whose interests - mainly economic - are served. Take the case of Musharraf seizing power and then under pressure from various governments, agreeing to a civil military set-up where the political prostitutes immediately agreed to side with him. So we had the sham elections where the Chauhdrys came into power and everything was OK and Musharraf became legitimate. Unfortunately, we have not had anyone who had the gumption to just steer a course that best serves our country's interest and hang everyone else. Until that happens we will continue to be ruled by political hijras.

  23. ayesha , the blog is not active since july 2010

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